Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals

4/19/2024

United States v. Patterson

United States v. Davis (ACCA).

The Games NCIS Play.

The lead agent began the rights advisement by saying, "Before we can talk to you, we just have to go over this form with you, okay?" He described it as "[n]ot a scary form" and "just a piece of paper."
After informing Appellant that he was suspected of indecent viewing, visual recording, and broadcasting, the lead agent asked him if he knew "the difference between being suspected of doing something and being accused of something." Appellant responded with "if you're suspected then you're suspected." The lead agent then explained,

[S]uspected of something means like "hey we need to talk to this person because they might have some kind of knowledge about it." Being in the military, if I think you have anything to do with this, I have to advise you of your rights. Okay. That's why I'm advising you of your rights. Uh. Because I want to know something you may have knowledge of.
. . .
Accused of something is when you're actually sitting in front of the judge and the judge is saying that you did this okay. So, if me and you are at the bar, you know, having some drinks and [John] falls down and starts bleeding and he points in our general direction and he says, "That guy stabbed me." Right? The police are going to want to talk to us because we might know something about [John] being stabbed without saying that we stabbed him. It's saying that we might have some kind of knowledge of what happened.
. . .
I don't want you to think that we are accusing you of anything. We're just here to find out some information.
. . .
A proper rights advisement under Article 31(b) and Tempia is more than a formality—it is not "just a piece of paper" or a mere "form" as the lead agent described it. And, more importantly, the plain language of Article 31(b) requires informing an accused or suspect of the "accusation" irrespective of whether "he is accused or suspected." The agent's departure from the statute's mandates—especially his explicit statement that he was not accusing Appellant of anything—rendered the rights advisement inadequate and Appellant's subsequent statements inadmissible in accordance with Article 31(d).

United States v. Patterson, No. 202200262, 2024 CCA LEXIS 130, at *13-14 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2024).

This issue of NCIS trickery has arisen in a number of DoN cases. Watch for it.

While appellate courts, including the Supremes, have said it's OK for investigators to lie during interrogations, not every lie or misleading statement is tolerated. In this case, NMCCA found the lie substantially prejudicial.

Even if we assume the rights advisement did not violate Article 31, we would still find, under the totality of the circumstances, that Appellant's due process rights were violated and that his statements to NCIS were not voluntary.

We find the military judge, in ruling otherwise, abused his discretion in three ways.

First, the military judge abused his discretion by failing to consider important facts. Specifically, while the military judge found it was "likely that there was some sort of admonishment by [LtCol Hill] to answer questions," he failed to consider the compound effect of that directive in relation to the agents' repeated reference to their need to report to Appellant's command. Similarly, as discussed supra, the military judge failed to consider the improper character of Appellant's rights warning.

Second, by focusing on LtCol Hill's intent rather than Appellant's perception, the military judge abused his discretion by using incorrect legal principles. The correct legal lens is from the perspective of the person making the statement.

Third, by finding LtCol Hill's conversation with Appellant "significantly attenuated" and doing so without discussion of what legal principle led to that conclusion, the military judge abused his discretion either by applying an incorrect legal principle or by applying the correct legal principle in a clearly unreasonable way.

Because of NCIS, NMCCA set aside a conviction in a serious case.

A Marine noticed a pen on the floor under a radiator in a male locker room. The Marine's examination of the pen found that it was not an ordinary pen because it had lights on it, what appeared to be a microphone, and an SD card inside.

An NCIS agent, with the assistance of an NCIS Digital Forensic Examiner, conducted a review of the SD card's contents. The review revealed a video of Appellant manipulating the device, looking directly at the camera, and placing it under the radiator where it was found. The content review also revealed numerous videos of what appeared to be Appellant engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with unknown men. There were deleted folders with names such as "Marine1," "Big Asia," "Big Asian Dude," and "Mexican Dude." Within the deleted folders, there were two videos of a male later identified as Captain J and one video of a male later identified as Captain C completely naked in their respective bedrooms.

Nathan Freeburg

4/16/2024 14:23:08

The “we are not accusing you only suspecting you” line is unofficial SOP across NCIS, Army CID and OSI.

Scott

4/16/2024 14:45:51

Yes, that is an extremely common opening comment

Cloudesley Shovell

4/17/2024 09:12:12

Pull the "law enforcement training" string more generally, and you'll find that it is completely standard practice to train not just NCIS, or FBI, or other federal agents, but all police officers and law enforcement officers generally in the fine art of avoiding constitutional or statutory mandates based entirely upon the various decisions of state and federal courts. All too often courts will massage the law in order to preserve a conviction in a serious case, and the law enforcement world quickly jumps on that little "exception" to add to their repertoire of sharp practices.

Inch by inch.

Good on NMCCA on holding the line.

Kind regards,
CS

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/17/2024 12:55:05

Yes, give an inch, they take a mile.

Donald G Rehkopf Jr

4/17/2024 09:30:13

Not to mention a failure of leadership. Do it right, or don't do it at all. TJAGs, do your jobs!

Philip D. Cave link

4/17/2024 10:01:29

1. Read Missouri v. Seibert (542 U.S. 600 (2004).

2. When we get a client who has not yet been interrogated, we give them quite a bit of advice on how to proceed. Just like any sentient DC, we tell them to immediately invoke. In addition, we discuss what will happen once they invoke and the trickery that follows.

a. They will be "held" there for some time because "we have to do the admin" and "we need to get an escort from the command" or words to that effect--Keep your mouth shut. The intended effect is to heighten the tension and anxiety in the client with the hope that they will "initiate" a dialogue that can be turned into a "But your Worship, he initiated the conversation and I merely responded, so the subsequent confession was all initiated by him, I didn't do anything." And we know how that goes on appeal. One of the many things I learned as a police officer was that the interrogator's silence, at times, can be a most effective "question."

b. When it comes to the mug shot, prints, and swab, the interrogators will then engage in some banter. This is how the interrogation began remember. The purpose of the first 10 to 30 minutes on that interrogation video you all see is pure psychology. Having set the tension level high by having the client sit for 10-15 minutes is to raise the anxiety level. Then comes the banter to not reduce the anxiety but to "bond" and become buddy buddy; which then leads to the Patterson issue. When they are buddy-buddy during the mug shot phase, that's another opportunity for the client to ask questions, which leads down the road to a "well, OK, I'll change my mind and waive my rights and confess." Etc., etc., etc.

c. It's all psychology. Interrogators don't use the phone book as a bludgeon anymore (especially as they are too heavy to wield).

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/17/2024 12:54:39

It's time to start getting the training from the schools the agents go to.

Someone also needs to have a chat with Lt Col Hill and remind him when someone gets called to NCIS, they get to refuse to answer their questions.

Philip D. Cave link

4/17/2024 13:16:50

We got the FLETC Fourth Amendment materials through FOIA while preparing the SCOTUS petition in Lattin (83 M.J. 192). The issue in Lattin was the application of Herring and Davis. Essentially we argued the dissent got it right, but for a slightly different reason. Except for a blurb on the case, there is nothing in the FLETC materials but a brief summary of the case. Digital searches are common these days, but it does not appear FLETC is interested in how digital searches ought to be conducted or limited. Essentially, Lattin affirms the OSI agent's testimony that FLETC teaches that once they have seized a cellphone by search authorization, they have the ownership and thus the right to search everything without limitation.

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/18/2024 19:53:44

I was referring to getting the training as part of discovery. Army and Marine CID agents still receive training at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, while NCIS and OSI get training at FLETC. Though there is a push to move CID training to FLETC as well.

Obviously there was (perhaps still is) a difference between what's being taught at FLETC and what's being taught at Ft. Leonard Wood.

Trial Counsel

4/18/2024 00:11:26

This strikes me as a terrible opinion. The agent clearly told the accused - an officer, not an E-1 - that he was "suspected" of the specified crimes on the form but not necessarily "accused." Article 31(b) is satisfied because it merely requires informing the accused that he is "accused OR suspected" of a crime (emphasis mine).

Here, the agent had the accused read a form saying that he was at least suspected of specific crime(s) and had the right to remain silent and speak with an attorney. The accused initialed the form and waived his rights. Should be end of the story.

The fact that an agent refers to the form as a "formality" is basically irrelevant. See United States v. Jackman, 214 F. App’x 814, 815 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that officer’s reference to Miranda rights as “formalities” signaled to appellant that they were “not to be taken seriously”).

TJAG should certify.

Anon

4/18/2024 09:29:53

Trial Counsel, wholeheartedly agree. Case after case supports what NCIS did. The offender is clearly guilty, and I think NCIS’s conduct falls within the gambit of acceptable. The flippancy and pride the Court takes in this opinion is truly bizarre - some joy even. In this case , those victims persevered to get to this conclusion, all to be set aside on a “formality.”

Allan

4/18/2024 13:45:06

TC,

The question is not whether the guy is guilty. Clearly, he is. The issue is "what are the boundaries for a proper interrogation?".

Personally, I believe that interrogators should face the same penalties for lying during an interrogation that interrogatees face. Put everyone on a level playing field.

Also, I think that people going into an interrogation should have the same training as interrogators. That is, if the interrogators have undergone training on how ot interrogate, interrogatees should have training on how to be interrogated. Absent that, there should be a DC on call for everyone who is to be questioned (just as there is a TC on call for NCIS).

So, interrogators could call the person in. When warranted, i.e., when Art. 31 warnings are mandatory, they should give the warnings immediately, no small talk, no talking to the suspect. Just "at this point we must give you your Art. 31 warnings. After you read, understand, and sign the document, we can talk. Of course, if the person asks for an attorney, there will be no interrogation.

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/19/2024 22:06:55

It's really disheartening to see those who took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution bash this decision, particularly those who go by a moniker of "trial counsel," whose mission is to obtain justice, not to obtain a conviction at the expense of an accused's Constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights. In this case, the NMCCA did its job.

"Totality of the circumstances" isn't just about an accused's intelligence level, age, schooling, training, etc. It's also about the combination of events that impact the accused's perception of whether his confession is voluntary, which the military judge didn't consider. You don't have to be Forrest Gump or Karl Childers for your confession to be "involuntary." A failure to consider "important facts" is an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dominguez, 81 M.J. 800 (NMCCA 2021).

While a military judge doesn't have to write a dissertation or law review article explaining his/her decision, they DO have to cite to SOME case law to support their conclusions of law. Apparently the military judge also failed to do that, especially the finding that the XO ordering Appellant to answer questions by NCIS was "significantly attenuated" from the defective rights advisal, which at the very least was confusing. Applying incorrect legal principles, or applying correct legal principles in an unreasonable way, also counts as "abuse of discretion."

By the way, the "voluntariness" of a confession is a de novo review, as it's a question of law. As for your reliance on Jackman, please be aware that it's been cited ONE time by a state court, and Jackman was a career criminal with multiple experiences being advised of his Miranda rights (including times he got a lawyer), so his claim that he didn't take it seriously because he was told it was a "formality" was baloney.

Philip D. Cave link

4/18/2024 12:48:51

TC. We disagree, which is fine. Your interpretation may ultimately be the approved one. But in this case, there are more "facts" that suggest the NMCCA is right in the result and on the law. As we know from experience, the CCA (or CAAF) opinions do not always contain all the facts. If the issue was purely 'Here are your rights, read, elect, and sign,' without anything else, I'd agree with you. But here we have a more robust timeline of events leading up to the appellant's decision to talk. I appreciate the appellant is a junior officer. But being trained and experienced to lead a platoon of Marines is far different from being ordered into NCIS and being told by your XO not to “squirrel around, just answer their questions.” Keep in mind that the appellate courts do occasionally drop a note about the inherently coercive nature of the military culture of orders, and the duty to obey orders.
The motion to suppress is in this "record." Unfortunately, neither the transcript nor the appellate briefs are publicly available. This is one of those cases where it would be nice from and educational perspective to have the transcript and the appellate briefs to further the discussion.

https://stjececmsdusgva001.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/public/documents/us_v_patterson_christopher_usmc.pdf

The defense motion to suppress is at at .pdf 39.

Trial Counsel

4/18/2024 13:44:18

Mr. C, Thanks for sharing the motion. And you are right in that it's much better to read the pleadings and review the evidence.

But upon perusing the pleadings, I found it interesting that the XO had no recollection of the "squirrel around" comment and denied telling the accused he had to answer the agents' questions. I missed this in reading the NMCCA opinion, likely because the Court only noted it in a footnote (FN 18). So unless I am missing something, the NMCCA simply adopted the accused's version of what occurred rather than the military judge's, which doesn't seem permissible as long as the MJ's choice was within the range of reasonableness. See United States v. Kelly, 72 M.J. 237, 242 (C.A.A.F. 2013) ("A military judge abuses his discretion when . . . the military judge's decision on the issue at hand is outside the range of choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the law.")

Separate note, as the Government's response notes, the accused was not only a JO but a highly intellligent one, scoring in the 97th percentile on the AFQT. Not dispositive, but certainly interesting.

Philip D. Cave link

4/18/2024 13:53:31

TC: Good points.

Perhaps part of the resolution on the discrepant testimony is that the XO was less believable than the smart lieutenant (keeping in mind that the MJ saw and heard the witnesses). The lieutenant's statement of what the XO told him seems to be genuine. That seems like the kind of statement an XO might make, and the appellant might remember.

In taking another look in the "record" I don't see the MJ's findings.

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/18/2024 14:43:48

The MJ found as fact that the XO "likely admonished Appellant to answer questions." Suggests that the MJ found Appellant more credible on this point than the XO, who magically experiences a "memory loss." The NMCCA's point on this issue was that the MJ misapplied the law by not considering Appellant's perspective of that order (this was not a casual conversation, Appellant was at home, after duty hours, changed into his uniform of the day because the XO ordered him to come to his office). MJ also misapplied the law in holding that the XO meeting was "attentuated" from NCIS meeting, when Appellant was in custody the entire time.

I believe it was also significant that when the agent began advising Appellant of his Article 31(b), UCMJ rights, the agent didn't inform Appellant of the "suspected" or "accused" allegation--he asked Appellant why he thought he was there, and didn't get into general allegations until about 10-15 minutes into the rights advisement. That is incredibly problematic. Also incredibly problematic that the agent followed the accused/suspected "distinction without a difference" with "we just want to get some information from you."

While the appellate briefs aren't available, the oral argument is, I'm sure that could also provide some enlightenment on the NMCCA's excellent and thorough opinion. https://stjececmsdusgva001.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/public/documents/PATTERSON_OA.mp3

Trial Counsel

4/18/2024 17:53:06

Tami,

Points well taken, but I feel we're splitting hairs. The MJ clearly found the XO to be credible ("LtCol Hill appeared credible, truthful, and forthright.") and found the accused to be not completely credible ("Appellant was less credible when he testified he did not think lying to NCIS was "squirrely"). That the MJ also found that the XO "likely gave Appellant some sort of admonishment to answer" was not inconsistent with the XO's testimony that he did not *recall* doing so.

The bigger issue is the CCA's creative application of the abuse of discretion standard. As you know, a CCA cannot simply reverse an MJ because it disagrees with his decision. Otherwise, a trial would have little conclusive effect. Rather, to be reversed, an MJ's decision must be *clearly wrong* -- outside the range of reasonable choices.

Next point: trial judges are not required to list out every fact they found significant in their rulings. As CAAF has explained, "[w]e do not expect record dissertations but, rather, a clear signal that the military judge applied the right law. While not required, where the military judge places on the record his analysis and application of the law to the facts, deference is surely warranted." United States v. Downing, 56 M.J. 419, 422 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

This brings us to the CCA's opinion on the Article 31(b) analysis. The CCA claims the MJ abused his discretion by failing to consider important facts." There is little evidence for this. The CCA admits the Government provided the MJ with the accused's interrogation. There is no indication the MJ did not review the video. That the MJ did not specifically list "in his ruling" the agent's "distinction between suspicion and accusation" does not mean he "failed to consider" these facts. At best, the failure of the MJ to discuss these facts would entitle his ruling -- on this specific point -- to less deference. But that's a far cry from throwing out the entire ruling on the basis that it was "clearly wrong."

The due process involuntariness analysis is even worse. There, the CCA admits that the MJ found it likely that the XO gave "some sort of admonishment" to the accused. Yet the CCA faults the MJ because he supposedly "failed to consider the compound *effect* of that directive in relation to the agents' repeated reference to their need to report to Appellant's command." (emphasis added) This looks to me like the NMCCA simply disagreeing with how much *weight* the CCA judge gave the remark.

The CCA quibbles with the fact that the MJ focused on the XO's intent behind the remark rather than its effect on the accused. The CCA may be right, but if the fact at issue is not important to the ultimate ruling, there's no abuse of discretion.

Finally, the CCA faulted the MJ's conclusion that the remark's effect was attenuated by the time of the interview. The CCA says the MJ should have discussed "what legal principle led to that conclusion." But again, an MJ is not required to spell out every legal doctrine that applies to his ruling.

All in all, this reads like a Panel that wanted to reverse the decision and bended and contorted the law to get to its desired result.

Scott

4/18/2024 14:42:31

Phil,

Regarding your point that appellate opinions don't always contain all of the facts, I recently cited to the publicly available briefs to give context to a CAAF opinion.

The government answer essentially argued that reference to the briefs was improper as they were not part of the opinion.

Allan

4/19/2024 08:47:48

TC. Yes, the opinion may "read[] like a Panel that wanted to reverse the decision and bended and contorted the law to get to its desired result." But the learning point one should take from the case is different. The point is: what the XO and the NCIS are accused of doing was wrong. And, given many of our life's experience, we can imagine them doing it.

How about getting NCIS trained in doing it right so that cases do not get overturned, rather than cry about people who have committed crimes being exonerated? Bad police training, along with a perceived unfairness of the entirety of criminal law, was probably why OJ was found not guilty.

The system that the constitution sets up to protect the people from government abuse. It is not set up to put people in jail. If you would like a different system, I guess you are free to move to Hungary, or Russia, or Iran. We (including you) should be celebrating that the system worked for this guy (for now), not bemoaning that he likely will not be incarcerated.

My guess is that the defendant's time in service will not be long. I think it likely that a quick administrative discharge is coming. He might be tried again, but I doubt it.

4/18/2024 14:36:36

Accussed of 'something' is if you are actually in front of a JUDGE (emphasis mine) and the judge says you did 'something.'

Well, the judges said the police did something. Or is that Accused the police of doing something? This is an unforced error on law enforcement part.

Good on the Panel.

William Cassara

4/18/2024 15:11:39

The sound quality of the oral argument is awful. The discussion points out the glaring problem we have with transparency in CCA's. I can go on nearly every federal court website and get all of the appellate briefs, and a (clear) audio of oral arguments. I can go on nearly every trial court website and see all of the pleadings and scheduled hearings. Why can't we have the same thing in military courts?

Concerned Defense Attorney

4/19/2024 10:36:43

I think the answer is that we don't have miltiary courts, at least not in the same sense. Courts-Martial are non-existent until each one is called into being by the convening authority, so that we are reinventing the wheel every time. I get that there is a JAG Corps enterprise so to speak that coordinates all this but I think the lack of standing courts is behind a lot of this. I think logistics (part of it being a lack of standing courts) drives a lot of mistakes in military courts (ACCA;s recent memorandum opinion in US v Davis is a good example of this and ACCA discusses it in those terms, i.e. logistics driving bad decisions though not necessarily in terms of standing courts).

Brenner Fissell

4/19/2024 10:52:10

At this point the lack of standing courts is a fiction. How can it be said there are not "standing courts" while there are judges who have fixed terms of office?

Not Where I Want to Be

4/19/2024 10:41:24

Service appellate courts setting aside findings of guilt based on a reasonable judicial ruling, when there are real victims of crime, is not where military justice should be or want to be. I find this even more persuasive as NCIS’s conduct does not clearly fall outside the gambit of Constitutionally acceptable despite the Court finding a smart, well-educated Officer’s statement involuntary. As a member of society, law enforcement using techniques within the bounds of the Constitution encouraging confessions by guilty people causes me no pause. What causes me pause is the disparate treatment of crime victims in the military justice system as compared to civilian counterparts.

Allan

4/19/2024 12:05:44

Not Where I Want to Be, where do you want to be? In an oppressive country? the US that I want is a place where 99 guilty people will go free so that 1 innocent person will not go to jail It seems that you would prefer that 99 innocent people be convicted so that 1 guilty person is convicted.

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/19/2024 22:12:21

Maybe "Not Where I Want to Be" should move to Italy, where victims' rights seem to prevail. But then, after many years, even that country's highest supreme court overturned Amanda Knox's conviction, and found her and her then-boyfriend innocent. Which I'm guessing this person would disagree with.

Nathan Freeburg

4/19/2024 13:12:57

Clearly a troll since no one would claim with a straight face that crime victims have more rights in non military jurisdictions .

William Cassara

4/19/2024 13:15:59

Whether you agree with the decision or not (I do) what should an appeals court do when they find that a service member was not properly advised of their rights? This is exactly why we have an exclusionary rule. Are you saying it should not apply to service members?

Not a troll

4/19/2024 23:23:45

@nathan freeburg what civilian courts do you practice in? I implore you to look at the “2022” DOJ victim-witness standards. https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2022/10/21/new_ag_guidlines_for_vwa.pdf
Compare the scope of access to discovery in military courts vs civilian courts; what civilian court authorizes access to entire electronic health records? (Hint - none). 2) look at the provisions for discovery and when an offender gets access to discovery (Hint - statements are only required to be disclosed after testimony on direct). 3) look at victim impact statements (Hint - rcm 1001(c) directly contradicts Fed. Rule 32) 4) all the federal rules put a burden on the judges to comply with the CVRA (nothing remotely similar in the military)… I can go on…

Philip D. Cave link

4/20/2024 09:52:02

1. Military courts do not routinely authorize access to entire electronic health records. There is a process where access can be court-approved, assuming the rules for access are followed, and the military judge follows the correct procedure. See, e.g., In re B.M. (https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/opinions/2023OctTerm/230233.pdf). (Note that in B.M., it was accidentally discovered that there are likely records and information substantially affecting the credibility of the CW, which the CW and SVC have denied access to).
2. Could you point me to a RCM or appellate case that suggests the military judge need not comply with Art. 6b., which is the military variant of the CVRA? I'm not seeing any meaningful difference between the two statutes.

3. The military approach to discovery and production is broader than the restrictive Jenck's Act process. After all, the effect of the JA is to surprise and hamper the defense at trial is it not--gamesmanship IMHO. The military has taken a broader view of discovery and production overall compared to state and federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Palik (https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/opinions/2023OctTerm/230206.pdf).
If the complaint is that military discovery is broader and better than in civilian courts--then I wholeheartedly agree with you and maybe the civilian courts ought to look to ways to make discovery better.
One thing federal courts now do which I'd like to see in the military is this requirement of judge. The Due Process Protections Act amended the federal rules of criminal procedure to require district courts to issue, at the outset of every criminal case, an order confirming the prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, and the consequences for violating the order. (https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1380).
Also, this part of the Justice Manual is a useful guide even for Trial Counsel. https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court-proceedings)

4. You are right that the military does not conduct sentencing in the same manner as FRCP 32. For example, there is no PSR, and sentencing is an adversarial process.

5. I'm not seeing the major distinction between FRCP 32(i)(4)(B), which states, (B) "By a Victim. Before imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably heard." Rather, I do not see a direct contradiction. 1001 seems to give a far better guide to MJs on how to take information from a victim at sentencing.

6. I have reviewed, again, the DoJ Guidelines, which address how DoJ and USAO officials should deal with alleged victims. (My memory may be off, but isn't there a Reserve Army Judge who is involved in the VVRA program at DoJ?). These are guidelines for prosecutors. I suspect some transparency might find similar guidelines for Trial Counsel. But, these are not guidelines for judges. What I do note is this interesting piece:

"Nothing in these Guidelines shall be construed to supersede a prosecutor’s disclosure and discovery obligations under the Constitution, case law, federal statutes, federal and court rules, or rules of professional conduct."

Brenner M. Fissell

4/20/2024 13:26:11

NF practices in the Eastern District of Virginia. Have you heard of it?

Nathan Freeburg

4/20/2024 14:53:28

Huh? Show me a civilian jurisdiction with robust SVC/VLC programs where they have standing to file and argue motions on evidentiary matters during a criminal trial.

Brenner M. Fissell

4/19/2024 18:00:22

Time to say the obvious: can't they achieve a conviction without this confession? They have video evidence...

Tami a/k/a Princess Leia

4/19/2024 20:11:42

Not on all specifications. Some specifications only came to light as a result of his statement, and they used his confession to obtain a search warrant for his residence (which yielded additional evidence) and an authorization for his phone.

The court didn't address the IAC for not filing a 4th Amendment motion to suppress, though it was addressed during oral argument. Whoever defense counsel is for the rehearing, I suspect they'll be filing one.

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