Appellant’s case is before us (AFCCA) for the second time. A general court-martial composed of officer members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of negligent dereliction of duty, one specification of rape, and four specifications of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in violation of Articles 92, 120, and 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 920, 933, corresponding to Charges I, II, and III, respectively. The court members adjudged a sentence of a dismissal, confinement for three years, and a reprimand.

whether Appellant’s lead civilian trial defense counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge a court member, failing to fully cross-examine the alleged rape victim, failing to request a certain findings instruction, failing to object to the alleged victim presenting her unsworn statement in question-and-answer format through trial counsel, and failing to disclose to Appellant a personal conflict of interest[.]

During presentencing proceedings, trial defense counsel objected to TS being permitted to give an unsworn statement to the court pursuant to R.C.M. 1001A on the grounds that the rule did not exist and unsworn victim statements were not authorized at the time of the offense in 1998. Trial defense counsel also objected to TS providing her unsworn statement orally in a question-and-answer format, on the grounds that R.C.M. 1001A did not specifically enumerate such an option, and to not being given an advance written copy of the unsworn statement. The trial judge ultimately overruled the first two objections, but she did require TS to present her oral unsworn statement in an Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a), session before providing it to the court members. During this Article 39(a), UCMJ, session, the military judge observed that R.C.M. 1001A(e)(2) “seem[ed] to require the victim’s own counsel do the questioning.” In response, trial defense counsel clarified that the Defense “d[id] not have an objection to the government counsel doing the question and answer.” After trial counsel additionally represented that the proposed question-and-answer presentation had been coordinated with TS’s Special Victims’ Counsel (SVC) and that it was what TS wanted, the military judge allowed it.

In their declarations, all three trial defense counsel state Mr. AC made a “strategic decision” not to object to trial counsel’s participation. As Mr. AC explained, the evident alternative was that TS’s SVC would conduct the questioning, and trial defense counsel believed questioning by the trial counsel would lead to a “more tightly constrained” and “less emotional” unsworn statement, which was preferable from the Defense’s perspective. We find this was a reasonable strategic decision to forego the objection.

This appeal involves the Navy's near-categorical refusal to accommodate servicemembers' inability to receive a vaccine due to their religious convictions. The district court twice enjoined the Navy's policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then went above and beyond it—rescinding all the challenged policies and formally announcing that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.
The Navy's actions moot this appeal. So, despite the overwhelming importance of the issues presented, we lack jurisdiction to address them.

 (3) whether a provision in Appellant’s plea agreement providing that dismissal of certain charges and specifications would ripen into dismissal with prejudice “upon completion of appellate review where the findings and sentence have been upheld” is void or otherwise unenforceable[.]
. . . 
​We have carefully considered issue (3) and find Appellant is not entitled to relief. See United States v. Goldsmith, No. ACM 40148, 2023 CCA LEXIS 8, at *15 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 11 Jan. 2023) (unpub. op.) (finding plea agreement term—requiring the convening authority to dismiss the additional charges and specifications with prejudice “upon completion of appellate review where the findings and sentence have been upheld”—permissible because it does not violate law or public policy).

(1) whether the military judge erred in admitting victim impact statements[.]
. . . 
​Appellant contends that the military judge abused his discretion when he admitted written unsworn statements by HoP, HP, and CJ during presentencing proceedings over trial defense counsel’s objections. Appellant argues now, as he did during presentencing, that a victim’s right to be reasonably heard is “tethered to” the physical presence of the crime victim at the presentencing proceeding pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1001(a)(3)(A). We disagree and find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion and that no relief is warranted.