Gray v. Payne

"Federal courts are empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to entertain habeas petitions from military prisoners. But our review of court-martial proceedings is very limited." Santucci, 66 F.4th at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (describing the standard of review as "deferential" and noting that "the deference we give to military tribunals is even greater than that we owe to state courts" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

To determine whether merits review of a military habeas corpus petition is appropriate, we consider four factors as articulated in Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1990):
1. "The asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension."
2. "The issue must be one of law rather than of disputed fact already determined by the military tribunals."
3. There must be no "[m]ilitary considerations [that] warrant different treatment of constitutional claims."
4. "The military courts must give adequate consideration to the issues involved and apply proper legal standards."
The fourth factor is "the most important." Santucci, 66 F.4th at 858 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Santucci, we clarified that "as a necessary condition for full merits review of a given claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that the resolution of each of the Dodson factors weighs in the petitioner's favor." Only then can a petitioner "show that the military tribunals have not given full and fair consideration to [his] claim."

The district court found that the military courts adequately considered Gray's ineffective assistance claim. It highlighted the ACCA's efforts to supplement the record by requesting affidavits from Gray's counsel and concluded that the ACCA's opinion shows that it rejected the claim only after a complete record analysis—thus giving full and fair consideration to his claim.

​Gray's discovery motion sought a transcript of a phone call between another USDB inmate and the victim, during which the victim supposedly told the inmate that she did not want to testify but her mother made her do so. The district court found that he had not shown good cause for discovery because (1) "the alleged statement by the victim does not suggest that petitioner did not commit the crime," and (2) "the facts at issue in the discovery request do not bear on the Dodson factors that preclude . . . merits review."

Anderson v. Garza

A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of providing alcohol to minors on divers occasions; wrongfully distributing marijuana on divers occasions; wrongfully distributing psilocybin (mushrooms) on divers occasions; wrongfully using mushrooms on divers occasions; sexually assaulting a child, GB; behaving in a disgraceful and dishonorable manner that seriously compromised his standing as an officer by wrongfully and dishonorably organizing individuals into a violent gang; wrongfully communicating a threat to AL on divers occasions; wrongfully communicating to MH a threat to injure ME by paying someone to assault ME; receiving consideration for arranging for KW, PW, WK, and other unnamed persons to engage in sexual intercourse with others; unlawfully entering ML's house; sexually assaulting a child, FT; wrongfully threatening to hurt, injure, or kill Captain (Capt) CM; wrongfully threatening to hurt, injure, or kill Special Agent (SA) JG; and wrongfully threatening to hurt, injure, or kill Airman Basic (AB) JS, in violation of Articles 92, 112a, 120b, 133, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 912a, 920b, 933, 934.3 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dismissal, confinement for 25 years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The military judge credited Appellant with 60 days of pretrial confinement credit. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence.

On appeal, Appellant argues that all of his convictions, except his provision of alcohol to minors, distribution of marijuana, mushroom use, and threats to AL, are legally and factually insufficient. Appellant also claims the Government failed to meet its discovery obligations; he was deprived his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at trial;6 the military judge erred in not granting additional sentencing credit for pretrial punishment Appellant suffered during a search of his pretrial confinement sleeping quarters; and post-trial delays in his case warrant meaningful relief.
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We find there is insufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction of unlawful entry. We also find that Appellant was subjected to pretrial punishment in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813, and is, therefore, entitled to additional, modest confinement credit. We find no other prejudicial error, affirm the remaining findings, and reassess the sentence below.