Airing on Channel 4 this Sunday is War and Justice: The Case of Marine A – a documentary special looking at Alexander Blackman, the first British soldier to be convicted of murder on a foreign battlefield since World War II.
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Known as Marine A before an anonymity order was lifted, Blackman was originally sentenced to life in prison after killing an injured Afghan insurgent in 2011, which was recorded by a fellow Marine's helmet camera.

Whilst the charges against Marines D and E were dropped, Marines A (Blackman), B and C pleaded not guilty and in October 2012, an interim order prohibiting the identification of all five Marines was made on the grounds that there was "a real and immediate risk to their lives".
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In November 2013, the Board of the Court Martial (sic) found Marine A guilty of murder but acquitted Marines B and C.
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In May 2014, the Court Martial Appeal Court upheld Blackman's life sentence but reduced his minimum term to 10 years. This was due to Blackman having "an outstanding service record" and "the effects on him from the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan" the most serious of which being "stress", according to the judgment.
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In March 2017, the Court Martial Appeal Court reduced Blackman's conviction to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, with it being revealed at the hearing that Blackman had a "recognised mental illness" at the time of the shooting, BBC News reported.

'This book chronicles my young life, my recruitment and training, my first deployments, and then my experiences in the Middle East, where I fought first in Iraq, and later completed two tours of duty in Helmand, Afghanistan - before finally confronting the final moment of my 2011 tour, and the killing of the Afghan insurgent which led to my conviction for murder.
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'I confront this moment in a spirit of total honesty, chronicling the weeks and months of a hellish tour that led up to it, the mental frailties the tour exposed - and, without seeking to make excuses, reclaim at least some of that experience for myself. 

'This is a searingly honest look at the brutal realities of life in the military.'

 Appellant claims that had he been better informed about the MJA 16 sentencing procedures election, he would not have agreed to an MJA 16 plea agreement even if it would have meant settling for a PTA with a higher possible sentence limitation. He asserts that the outcome would have been different had he elected pre-MJA 16 sentencing procedures because he could have fared better in sentencing. 

There is nothing in the record to indicate that but for his counsels’ alleged error, Appellant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
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​Finally, in focusing narrowly on his own desires in the plea negotiations, Appellant overlooks that there was another party involved in the negotiations—the convening authority. On the one hand, Appellant’s main concerns were to minimize confinement and to preserve his retirement eligibility. On the other hand, the convening authority desired a minimal term of confinement and no protection from a punitive discharge. Hired with the primary goal of successfully negotiating a plea agreement, and reminded that the former CDC had been fired for his inability to secure one, Appellant’s CDC sought the most favorable terms in the back-and-forth negotiations with the convening authority. Recognizing the futility of attempting to convince the convening authority to protect Appellant from a punitive discharge, CDC leveraged the dishonorable discharge term to reduce Appellant’s exposure to confinement. Negotiating the confinement cap became a key issue for the parties. Appellant’s initial proposed plea agreement offered 60 days of confinement with a confinement cap of 48 months, while the convening authority proposed a cap of 72 months. Ultimately the parties settled on 55 months. Seen in the light of the previous failed plea negotiations, the ultimately successful multi-week plea negotiations, and the convening authority’s own goals, we are convinced that Appellant’s TDC discussed the MJA 16 sentencing procedural framework with him, despite his statements to the contrary.

​Appellant’s offenses were serious and had lasting impacts on the victims. He admitted to having secretly recorded his undressed fellow shipmates over a period of months while they were living in the very close confines of a deployed submarine. Appellant unlawfully made videos capturing at least 40 Sailors—13 of whom were identified by NCIS—which he filed away for personal viewing and maintained for nearly four years until their discovery by law enforcement. Multiple victims testified about the impacts of Appellant’s offenses, describing persistent physical reactions when considering the crime, loss of trust, and feeling “disgusted.”47 Additionally, Appellant admitted to having purchased thousands of images and videos of children engaged in sexual acts, in which over 350 victims were identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Appellant sought out and paid for these images and videos, and then kept them for years on multiple electronic devices until they were seized by law enforcement. In mitigation, Appellant presented evidence of his long naval career, acceptance of responsibility, expressions of remorse, and efforts at rehabilitation. Nonetheless, . . .

abuse[] his discretion when he permitted, over Defense objection, the mother of a deceased Sailor to make a victim impact statement when Appellant was not found guilty of an offense relating to the deceased Sailor.

Appellant’s convictions arise out of an incident occurring aboard Naval Station Great Lakes in which a fellow Sailor, Fire Controlman Seaman Recruit [FCSR] Echo,4 died in his barracks room of a drug overdose. An investigation revealed that the day prior to FCSR Echo’s death, he and Appellant traveled to Chicago where they obtained heroin and drug paraphernalia. They used the heroin in Chicago and then returned to the installation where they continued to use the drug. FCSR Echo was found dead by his roommate the following morning. During the investigation, Appellant was interviewed by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] and made false statements regarding the circumstances surrounding FCSR Echo’s death. Appellant was charged with involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, obstructing justice, wrongful interference with an administrative proceeding, wrongful introduction of a controlled substance, violation of a lawful general order, willful disobedience of a superior officer, wrongful drug use, and making false official statements. Before trial, he entered into a pretrial agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to wrongful drug use, violating a lawful general order by possessing drug paraphernalia, and making false official statements, in exchange for the convening authority referring his case to a special court-martial.

The circumstances of those offenses involved a joint enterprise between Appellant and FCSR Echo to obtain, purchase, and use heroin together. Appellant bought the drug paraphernalia and provided the needle FCSR Echo used to inject the heroin that ultimately caused his death. As such, we determine that the psychological harm FCSR Echo’s death caused to FCSR Echo’s mother directly arose from the offenses of wrongful drug use and possession of drug paraphernalia of which Appellant was found guilty.

Appellant was initially charged with, among other things, robbing another Soldier of $55,000. He negotiated a plea agreement, which included his promise to request trial by military judge alone. Appellant tried to plead guilty in accordance with the agreement, but he was not provident to all aspects of the robbery charge. The convening authority withdrew from the agreement, and the military judge said of future proceedings:

          [M]ore than likely I am going to detail a different judge tothat trial. ... [T]he only reason I wouldn't do that is if the defense affirmatively waives any issues regarding me
remaining as the military judge on this case. I certainly think I can be impartial, and won't be [a]ffected by . . .

Appellant faults his civilian defense counsel and trial defense counsel (hereinafter referred to collectively as defense counsel [, see, e.g., United States v. Boone, 42 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 1995). And see United States v. Golston, 53 M.J. 61, 67 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (Gierke, J., concurring) (this team approach is equally applicable to the prosecution.)] for several deficiencies: failing to admit evidence of a potentially mitigating matter during sentencing; not advising him to address this and two other potentially mitigating matters in his unsworn statement; and not requesting tailored instructions regarding these matters. 
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[Appellant alleges] trial counsel committed prosecutorial misconduct when they stated that they represented ‘the pursuit of justice’ and argued justice would only be served if appellant was convicted and adjudged a sufficient punishment.” Appellant contends that circuit trial counsel and assistant trial counsel (hereinafter referred to collectively as trial counsel) made improper statements and may have caused the court-martial to find him guilty and to sentence him on considerations beyond the admitted evidence​.

​In his closing argument, trial counsel admonished the members, “You will have the ultimate decision on . . . whether justice will be served, or whether the accused will be acquitted,” as if to say an acquittal would not be justice. Civilian defense counsel responded these are “words that should never come out of a prosecutor’s mouth;” I agree. The majority commented that “‘Justice’ must be tethered to the evidence and the burden of proof lest it be confused with justice for the victim or society or the military justice system.” Unfortunately for Appellant, looking at his case as a whole, I question whether “justice” has been served. I respectfully dissent.

[S]ix [of eight] references to justice are not so easily dismissed. If we were to review these other statements in isolation, each of them would raise significant concerns. The members might have understood the twice-repeated statement during voir dire—“I’m here . . . in the pursuit of justice in this case”—to imply that Appellant’s defense counsel were not there to pursue justice. The members might have understood trial counsel’s request in his opening statement—“repair the little that can be repaired and bring justice to [A1C M.T.] by finding the accused guilty”—to mean that members should focus on providing relief to A1C M.T. rather than assessing the evidence. The members similarly might have understood trial counsel’s first remark during his findings argument—“you will have the ultimate decision . . . whether justice will be served, or whether the accused will be acquitted”—to mean that they should focus on justice rather than on the evidence. And both this remark and the other statement during findings ignore the Government’s burden of proving guilt. Finally, the second mention of justice during sentencing argument—“[A] sufficient punishment . . . will bring some form of closure to [A1C M.T.] for all that she has . . . endured in this year-and-a-half nightmare”—may have misguided the members.

The Government, however, makes three responses. First, the Government argues that this Court should not view trial counsel’s statements in isolation, but instead under Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 637, must view them in context. Second, the Government argues that, in viewing the six problematic statements, we should not ascribe to them the “most damaging meaning . . . from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” Id. at 647. Third, the Government argues that even if some statements were improper, the AFCCA was still correct in concluding that any error was harmless under the Fletcher factors.