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CAAFlog

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1/18/2023

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United States v. Pyron, stems from a rehearing after the case had been set aside because of a member issue. Original NMCCA published opinion, 81 M.J. 637 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2021) here.
​This case stems from an interlocutory appeal under Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 862 (2018). At a rehearing in this case, the military judge denied the Government’s motion to admit Appellant’s testimony from his original court-martial. We hold that the military judge abused his discretion by excluding this evidence. Because the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) reached the same conclusion, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.
. . .
​The Government then moved to admit Appellant’s testimony from his first trial under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 801(d)(2) as an admission by a party opponent. Citing the standards imposed by relevant case law, the Government argued that the “testimony was not induced by the Government’s use of wrongfully introduced evidence nor was it the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.” The defense opposed the Government’s motion, asserting that Appellant’s prior testimony “was induced by the Government’s actions and it [was] unfairly prejudicial.”
What was the Government action? A member in the first trial had given answers in voir dire suggesting his having a daughter may affect his decision making. Yet neither party nor the MJ followed up on that. Later,
As the CCA noted in its decision, “neither trial counsel nor the military judge asked any further questions of LT Alpha” to rehabilitate him. Id. And yet later in the process, “the trial counsel [mistakenly] made arguments regarding the [defense] challenge for cause that suggested a rehabilitation colloquy had been conducted, and the military judge ​adopted those incorrect facts and based his denial of the [defense] challenge [for cause] upon them.” Nevertheless, the CCA did “not find that the trial counsel intentionally misled the military judge as to LT Alpha’s answers.” Instead, the lower court found that trial counsel made an “honest mistake.” But because of this prejudicial error, the court set aside and dismissed the findings and sentence and authorized a rehearing.
The question then becomes whether the "error" at the first trial is the type of prosecution misconduct that resulted induced Appellant's testimony at the first trial. Here is the nub of the answer.
There is a “general evidentiary rule that a defendant’s testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings.” Harrison, 392 U.S. at 222). As explained by the Supreme Court:

     A defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him.

However, the Supreme Court announced an exception to this general rule: If the government engaged in illegal conduct and this conduct prompted the accused’s testimony, the government may not use “any testimony impelled” by this illegality because it is “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. Thus, under Harrison, an accused’s testimony at a prior trial is admissible at a subsequent trial unless (1) the government engaged in illegal conduct at the first trial, and (2) the government’s illegal conduct induced the accused’s prior testimony. See id.
The Chief concludes that the TCs mistake is not the type of illegal conduct contemplated in the Harrison exception. It seems that

"in United States v. DeWitt, this Court’s predecessor definitively refused to extend the Harrison exception “to instances . . . where there is no primary illegality on the part of the Government’s” agents. 3 M.J. 455, 456 (C.M.A. 1977)."

DeWitt was a UA case. The appellant had unsuccessfully challenged admissibility of the Army form recording that he was absent from a certain date and time. He then changed his plea to guilty. However, the MJ rejected the guilty plea. So, it became a NG case again. At this point, the prosecution offered his statements made in response to his guilty plea along with the form and gained a conviction. On appeal CMA held it error to admit the form but found sufficient evidence from the providence (in court under oath) statements to sustain a conviction.

Because it was a judicial error in admitting evidence that caused the testimony

"Such lofty motive as prompted the Supreme Court in 
Harrison and this Court in Bearchild would not be served by extending this doctrine to instances such as this case, where there is no primary illegality on the part of the Government’s investigators."

Fn. 3 cites two federal cases with a similar result--judicial errors are not primary illegality of the prosecution.

In 
Pyron II we have a combination--a TC who was wrong about the voir dire of one member and whether he had been rehabilitated, a defense counsel who did not point that error out, and a military judge who had forgotten (or not noted) that the TC was wrong and so did not correct the error.

A collateral point from Pyron II would be that of situational awareness.

Sr. Judge Crawford was the sit-in judge for this unanimous opinion.
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