RAF chief Sir Mike Wigston has been told he must fix its "rigged" court martial system - with a legal expert claiming incidences of incident (sic) exposure, assault, intimidation and even rape were frequently going unpunished.

However, a Ministry of Defence spokesman stressed there was no place for sexual assault or harassment within the armed forces - and pointed out the conviction for rape within the Service Justice System was four times lower than that of the civilian system. Kate Roos, Senior Solicitor in the Military Claims Team at Bolt Burdon Kemp, was speaking after whistleblowers complained of a bullying environment within the Red Arrows, which had led to three leaving the team.
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[V]iewed as a proportion of allegations reported, rather than of cases prosecuted, the conviction rate in the Service Justice System is around eight percent compared to around two percent in the civilian system.

Cross-posted with GMJR.

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Sergeant First Class@expressed a strongly held belief that consent to sexual intercourse must be expressed verbally. When asked by the defense counsel, "[d]o you think consent to sexual intercourse has to be verbal?" SFC responded, "[y]es." Defense counsel then quoted the definition of consent that the military judge would later use in instructions. and then asked: "[s]o if you saw the words 'consent is a freely given agreement,'you would think that agreement has to be a verbal agreement?" SFC responded with: "(i]t has to be verbal without intoxication."

When it came time for the MJ to question SFC he attempted torehabilitate the member, asking, "[i]f my definition of consent differs from you[r] own personal beliefs, would you be able to follow my definition?" to which SFC replied, "[y]es, sir."

During their turn to question SFC the government revisited his understanding of consent, again attempting to rehabilitate the panel member, asking: "If someone else were to indicate with a thumbs up or a nod, would that be interpreted as consent for you?" SFC replied, "I would have to hear it, personally." And when asked one final time if it was his personal view that consent must be verbal, SFC responded, "[a] thumbs up or a nod could be a miscommunication between the two, so it's best to clear it up." 

​R.C.M. 914 requires the government to make available to the defense, after a witness has testified, any statement possessed by the United States that the witness has made. In its opinion, the lower court agreed that the military judge erred in her application of R.C.M. 914. However, the lower court determined that the error did not substantially influence the findings.

After review of the record, we conclude that the military judge’s error in not striking the relevant testimony pursuant to R.C.M. 914 had a substantial influence on the findings. Consequently, the lower court’s decision is reversed and the findings and sentence are set aside.

Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) released the Fiscal Year 2021 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military.
This year’s report, which is required by Congress and published by DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, contains survey results, reporting data, and military justice case outcomes.  The report also provides updates on the Department’s efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assault throughout Fiscal Year 2021.
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The Fiscal Year 2021 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military and a fact sheet with the topline results are available on https:// www.sapr.mil/reports

Appellant asserts trial counsel’s statement that the court had “heard no evidence” that Appellant had “actually gotten help” during the “yearand-a-half” of investigation was improper because the Defense had no obligation to put on evidence. The implication of trial counsel’s comment was that the Defense had failed to introduce such evidence. We agree this argument by trial counsel was, at a minimum, poorly phrased. Trial counsel is generally not permitted to comment on the failure of the defense to produce evidence. Taylor, 47 M.J. at 324 (C.A.A.F. 1997). Although Taylor and the cases cited therein dealt specifically with evidence for findings, with regard to sentencing evidence this court has noted: “Whenever trial counsel chooses to argue that an accused has not ‘shown’ the sentencing authority something, counsel treads backwards into a mine field in over-sized galoshes while wearing a blindfold.” United States v. Feddersen, No. ACM 39072, 2017 CCA LEXIS 567, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 21 Aug. 2017) (unpub. op.). In response, the Government cites United States v. Edwards for the principle that trial counsel may comment on an accused’s expression of remorse in an unsworn statement that “can be arguably construed as being shallow, artificial, or contrived.” 35 M.J. 351, 355 (C.M.A. 1992) (citations omitted). However, this response misses the mark. The concern is not that trial counsel commented on Appellant’s unsworn statement, but that he did so by implying the Defense failed to introduce evidence substantiating Appellant’s statement, rather than referring to “other evidence in the record which gives rise to the inference that [the] accused [wa]s not remorseful.”