No. 26-0154/NA. U.S. v. Ruben Cruz. CCA 202400211. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issues:
 
I.  Whether Appellant's plea was improvident based on a misunderstanding of the convening authority's options when acting upon Appellant's request to transfer to the Fleet Reserve.
 
II. Whether Appellant's trial defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising Appellant on the request to transfer to the Fleet Reserve in connection with Appellant's plea agreement.
 
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside.
 
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for remand to that court to obtain an affidavit from trial defense counsel that responds to Appellant's allegations that his plea was improvident and that his trial defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. A hearing is authorized under Article 66(f)(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(f)(3) (2018), if the court determines it is necessary to further develop the record. The Court of Criminal Appeals shall then review the granted issues in light of the affidavit and any other relevant matters. Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2018), shall apply.

In recognition of NIMJ's continued expansion and increasing prominence, the Executive Board has created three Chairs to be held by those who, in the estimation of NIMJ, contribute as the most significant national voices in the field of military justice. Each chair honors historic figures in the development of military law.

The William Winthrop Chair in Military Law: 

​Eugene R. Fidell
​
This chair honors William Winthrop, a treatise writer and scholar from the 1800s who was among the first to systematize military law. The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to Winthrop as “Blackstone of Military Law,” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19, n. 38,  (1957). NIMJ accordingly confers this chair on the most learned and prominent living scholar of military justice in the United States: Eugene Fidell. Fidell, like Winthrop, spent decades convincing an often-reluctant legal academy (and bar) that military justice was a field worthy of serious study. Without these efforts, the field would have remained an intellectual backwater. Because of him, it is not. He has mentored a generation of law professors as well as hundreds of law students at Yale, where he regularly teaches military justice. 

The Ansell-Crowder Chair in Military Justice Reform:

Rachel VanLandingham

Military justice, like all law, is constantly in flux. From time to time, there are significant debates about its fundamental character. One of the most prominent of these debates occurred between two military lawyers after WWI: Major General Enoch H. Crowder & Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell. Fred L. Borch, Military Justice in Turmoil: The Ansell-Crowder Controversy of 1917-1920, The Army Lawyer (March 2017). This chair honors these two men for spurring public deliberation about the future of military justice. NIMJ accordingly confers this chair on the most prominent scholarly advocate for the reform of military justice in the United States: Rachel VanLandingham. VanLandingham, like Ansell and Crowder, has been at the center of all significant debates about the future of military justice--advising Senators, Secretaries, and the public, where she frequently appears in the nation's most prominent media outlets. 

The Morgan-Larkin Chair

Vacant

This chair honors the architects of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Edmund Morgan and Felix Larkin. Prior to the UCMJ, servicemembers' lives and liberty were subject to the archaic and draconian Articles of War (even up to WWII)--a legal regime that did not even have judges. The UCMJ created what is now known as CAAF.

The NIMJ Board welcomes nominations for this Chair from the public (please send email to [email protected]). 

I have a long list of interesting "quotes"; you may know the 'skunk in the jury box' and something about a five-day-old dead fish. (Personally, I think the dead fish analogy sets the bar too high to establish an abuse of discretion; that's an impossibility, it seems, assuming the brief was not filed in person wrapped around the fish. Or is it. I remembered and retrieved this article from a little over a year ago.) Upon reporting to Code 45, I was told about the Division seal. See Colin A. Kisor, The Need for Sentencing Reform in Military Courts-Martial, 58 Nav. L. Rev. 39 (2009), at n. 13, (citing United States v. Jones, 7 M.J. 806, 808 (1979)), for the phrase "like ducks to water" in describing the civilianization of military justice, which was incorporated into the Code 45 seal with an image of three ducks. I forget why the snakes were incorporated (it was something along the lines of issues lurk within the record like snakes in the grass). Reading Ruhrup, I'm adding "Although an expert consultant frequently morphs into an expert witness . . . like a caterpillar into a butterfly . . ."

All humour aside, there is a lesson we all need to learn or remember about the distinction between requesting defense expert assistance pre-trial and at trial, and requesting a defense expert to testify. Unlike the Government, the defense has some wickets to climb over.

ACCA's teaching moment begins on page 4.

United States v. Kershaw clarifies an important question about the scope of a service Court of Criminal Appeals' factual sufficiency review under the prior version of Article 66, UCMJ. When a discrepancy exists between a fact pleaded by the government and a fact proven at trial — and when that fact is not an integral part of an element of the charged offense — a CCA possesses the authority to conduct a variance analysis and test the discrepancy for prejudice. That authority exists regardless of whether the trier of fact made exceptions and substitutions at trial. If the variance analysis reveals no prejudice, the CCA may affirm despite the discrepancy.

In United States v. Washington, CAAF reversed an Air Force abusive sexual contact conviction. The military judge had struck a substantial portion of the accused's direct testimony after concluding that the testimony implicated M.R.E. 412. The majority held that the judge abused his discretion because the struck testimony was about circumstances intrinsic to the charged offense. The Court returned to a familiar evidentiary doctrine at the center of M.R.E. 412 litigation: res gestae.

​Monday, April 20, 2026
Order Granting Petition for Review
 
No. 26-0156/MC. U.S. v. Thomas E. Kruse. CCA 202500370. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal by the United States under Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 862, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issue:
 
Whether the lower Court's ruling on the exclusive authority granted to the Special Trial Counsel under Article 24a, UCMJ, runs counter to the statute's plain meaning, the will of Congress, and creates an absurd result.
 
Pursuant to C.A.A.F. R. 19(a)(6)(A), no further pleadings will be filed.
​
NMCCA's published opinion.

Insulted from Review: Rocha II and Reviewing Factual Insufficiency

After much anticipation, CAAF has released its latest iteration of an opinion in United States v. Rocha. In Rocha, Appellee was convicted of indecent conduct for using a childlike sex doll. On its first review, CAAF reversed the AFCCA’s holding that the Appellee lacked fair notice his conduct was criminally sanctionable. United States v. Rocha, 84 M.J. 346, 352 (C.A.A.F. 2024). CAAF remanded the case to the AFCCA, and on its second review of the case, the AFCCA held the Appellee had a “constitutionally protected liberty interest to privately engage in sexual activities with his doll.” United States v. Rocha, 2025 CCA LEXIS 10, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 15, 2025) (unpublished). There has been significant coverage of this case from both within the military justice community[1] and in the broader media[2]. The lurid details of the case grab the media’s attention. While an advocacy group hoped CAAF would address the framework military courts apply for substantive due process privacy rights.[3] Yet the Court’s lead opinion[4] says little at all about that framework. See United States v. Rocha, No. 25-0157, slip op. at 2-12 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 16, 2026) (Rocha II). But there is an underappreciated aspect of the case: has CAAF interpreted its own governing statute in such a way that its immunized CCA factual insufficiency determinations from review? Given the isolated nature of the conduct at issue, the split amongst CAAF’s judges regarding the scope of CAAF’s review may come to represent the lasting significance of the Rocha series of cases.

The critical split between the opinions joining the judgment and the dissent concerns the scope of the CCA’s factual insufficiency holding. The lead opinion and concurrence viewed the CCA’s factual insufficiency holding as preclusive while the dissent—at great length[5]—takes issue with the CCA’s underlying legal reasoning. Yet, even between the lead opinion and the concurrence, the opinions approach the reviewability of the CCA’s factual insufficiency holding differently.

The plurality argues if the CCA had failed to follow the remand instructions, then another remand would be in order. For this reason, it begins by addressing the TJAG’s first certified question: whether the CCA failed to follow CAAF’s remand instructions. And it expressly cautions, “a remand would be necessary if the AFCCA had failed to comply with our remand order.” Id. at 8. Only after concluding that the CCA complied with the remand order did the lead opinion then hold that CAAF lacked the authority to disturb the CCA’s factual insufficiency holding.

The concurrence takes a different tack. The concurrence joined Part IV of the lead opinion addressing CAAF’s review of a CCA’s factual insufficiency holding. Yet it views the question of whether the CCA complied with the remand order as moot. See Rocha II (Maggs, J., concurring at 2). It also addresses an overriding concern raised by the dissent concerning the precedential value of the CCA’s opinion in the Air Force.[6] Id. at 4 n.2.

Unsurprisingly, the dissent disagrees with their framing. Instead, the dissent opens by reciting a litany of facts it views the plurality and concurrence missed. See Rocha II at 1-3 (C.J., Ohlson, dissenting). It then takes issue with the plurality opinion’s approach to the remand instructions and how the case should have proceeded if the CCA had properly followed the remand order. See id. at 3-12.

Standing alone, Rocha II does not amount to what supporters or detractors of the CCA’s decision might have thought. The plurality addresses Lawrence v. Texas and the scope of a right to privacy, but only through the lens of the CCA’s own analysis of the issue. It does not assert—one way or the other—which is correct. The concurrence likewise sidesteps the issue and the dissent, well…it’s a dissent. Underlying the tension here though is a recurring feature of these cases where the CCA holds a conviction to be factually insufficient. Does CAAF have authority to reverse such findings where it finds errors of law?

CAAF “lacks the authority to make its own findings of fact or to conduct its own factual sufficiency review, but retains the authority to review factual sufficiency determinations of the CCAs for the application of ‘correct legal principles, but only as to matters of law.” Rocha II at 6 (plurality opinion) (citation modified). Increasingly though, the Court has narrowed the aperture through which legal errors may be reversed. In United States v. Patterson, the Court held “only that we lack authority to review the AFCCA’s determination that the evidence was factually insufficient to prove the facts alleged in the specification at issue.” Patterson, 86 M.J. 24, 29 (C.A.A.F. 2025). Disregarding legal errors in the CCA’s decision, CAAF likewise held in Downum, “a conviction cannot stand if either a court-martial (in the first instance) or a CCA (on factual sufficiency review) finds the evidence factually insufficient to support a finding of guilty.” United States v. Downum, 86 M.J. 200, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2025). And this is all in the context of United States v. Csiti where the Court left its review of a CCA’s factual insufficiency holding untouched despite a statutory amendment to Article 67. See United States v. Csiti, 85 M.J. 414 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

Taken together, these cases trend in a direction where the CCA can effectively immunize its decisions from review by asserting the view that the conviction is factually insufficient. In future cases, if the CCA judges believe strongly in the correctness of their decision on legal grounds but worry about potential reversal by CAAF, they can add a quick nod to the conviction being factually insufficient to avoid undue scrutiny of their decision. It also suggests the possibility that a CCA could believe the conviction was entirely legal and proven, but disagree with the Government’s charging decision or found the appellant sympathetic, and as a result, find a conviction factually insufficient as a way to reduce or eliminate the appellant’s convictions. Indeed, this may also end up being the fulcrum by which CAAF itself decides whether it will review the CCA’s factual insufficiency decision. If a majority of judges believe the conduct to be criminally sanctionable, then it may pierce the CCA’s reasoning to probe for legal errors, but where a majority takes issue with the conviction, it can rest on its scope of review and claim its’ hands are tied.

This has significance not only for other cases this term (looking at you United States v. Kershaw), or even future cases, but also the relationship between CAAF and the CCAs. The dissent’s attack on the CCA judges’ integrity harkens back to an earlier era of frank hostility between the CCAs and CAAF (then CMA). See United States v. Nordstrom, 5 M.J. 528 (N.C.M.R. 1978) (CMA opinion lacks “logic and meaning”); United States v. Lilly, 7 M.J. 701 (N.C.M.R. 1979) (CMA opinion is “mystifying unless it can be written off as nothing more than an improvident and unfortunate mistake.”)

In an earlier era, the Court took a strong stand against equitable rulings by CCAs, saying in United States v. Nerad:

We hold that while CCAs have broad authority under Article 66(c), UCMJ, to disapprove a finding, that authority is not unfettered. It must be exercised in the context of legal -- not equitable -- standards, subject to appellate review. Relatedly, while Article 66(c), UCMJ, affords a CCA broad powers, when faced with a constitutional statute a CCA cannot, for example, override Congress’ policy decision, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be prohibited.
​
Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 140 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Under this new insulated review, equitable rulings may, in practice, be back under the guise of factual sufficiency review.       

___________________________
[1] See, e.g., U. S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces--grant - National Institute of Military Justice, Rocha? - National Institute of Military Justice.

[2] See, e.g., Military Law Doesn’t Clearly Forbid Private Masturbation With Child-Like Sex Doll, Airman’s indecent conduct conviction reversed following 5 years of litigation | Stars and Stripes.

[3] Rocha250157AmicusCuriaeBrief.pdf.

[4] Most of the lead opinion was only joined by Judge Hardy and Judge Johnson. Judge Maggs only joined Part IV of the lead opinion. As a result, most of the lead opinion is a plurality opinion.

[5] The tenor of the dissent (and the lack of a “I respectfully dissent”) and the attack on the integrity of the CCA judges suggests this was quite a controversial opinion at the Court.

[6] Here, the dissent has the better of the argument. The CCA’s opinion is a dual-holding opinion. See Rocha, 2025 CCA LEXIS 10, at *3. Dual holding opinions have alternative rationales that each could independently lead to the same result. See Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 795, 826–27 (2017). Courts treat such dual-holding opinions as though both (or all) alternative rationales are the holding of the case. Id. at 827 (citations omitted). Indeed, the bulk of the CCA’s analysis addresses the scope of constitutional privacy protection. If anything, the additional conclusion of the evidence being factually insufficient is flippantly added at the end—perhaps to forestall the very review the dissent sought to apply?

Consolidated report for the services (CG pending).

​Thursday, April 9, 2026
Order Granting Petition for Review
 
No. 26-0109/AR. U.S. v. Sherwood E. Reed. CCA 20240321. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issue:
 
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE DENIED THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVICTIONS FOR SPECIFICATIONS 4 AND 6 OF THE CHARGE AS MULTIPLICIOUS.

Friday, April 3, 2026
 
Order Granting Petition for Review
 
No. 26-0062/AR. U.S. v. Brady T. Wicks. CCA 20230171. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issue:
 
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF THE LOGICAL EXTRACTION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S CELLPHONE LOCATED IN A CID EVIDENCE LOCKER.
 
No briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

Braum at AFCCA

​Briefs at CAAF: Appellant, Appellee, Reply

A military judge sitting at a general court-martial at Fort Drum convicted First Lieutenant Brady T. Wicks of one specification of sexual assault under Article 120, UCMJ, contrary to his pleas. The judge acquitted him of a second sexual assault specification and one domestic violence specification. The court sentenced Wicks to dismissal from the service and three days of confinement.
On appeal to ACCA, Wicks one assignment of error: the military judge wrongly denied his motion to compel discovery of the full logical extraction of the victim's cell phone, which CID held in an evidence locker. The victim had consented only to a search of text messages between herself and Wicks. Because CID's Cellebrite software at the time could not perform a targeted extraction, agents extracted the phone's entire contents but limited their review to the authorized text messages.
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals, affirmed. The court held that the military judge did not abuse his discretion for several reasons: the full extraction never entered the government's possession, custody, or control for discovery purposes because the victim only granted limited consent; the victim retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the remaining phone data under the Fourth Amendment; the defense failed to show the full extraction would provide relevant evidence that could impeach any witness; and adequate substitutes — including the text messages and victim-provided screenshots — already existed in the record. Even assuming the judge erred, the court found no prejudice under a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

Seems CAAF could affirm ACCA and avoid the harder questions, because

(2) The defense had not met its burden under R.C.M. 701(a)(6) to show that the provision of the full extraction would provide any evidence that would adversely affect the credibility of the victim.

(4) The defense had not established that the remaining data on the cell phone was relevant and necessary. Many of the text message chains provided by the victim pre-dated the charged offense; they did not establish a motive to fabricate, and the text messages did not confirm the sexual acts themselves.
(5) The defense argument on the full extraction being subject to compulsory process fell short because the defense could not establish any evidence that the full extraction would be of such central importance to the defense and that no adequate substitute existed.

No harm, no foul.