Whatever happened to

Audley G. Evans?

He was sentenced to LWOP for murder at a court-martial in 2005. However, "The negotiated plea evidently allowed petitioner to avoid a death sentence, so he was officially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." Evans v. United States, No. 5:24-cv-00959 (D.C.C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025).

(I suspect the deal was to withdraw the death penalty referral so they could negotiate a deal on not to proceed as a "capital" case. See R.C.M. 705 and 910; cf., United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 620 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (complex post A.F.C.M.R. stuff omitted) ("First of all, there is no constitutional right to plead guilty. United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 362. Second, Congress has specified that an accused may not plead guilty to any offense for which the death penalty may be adjudged. Article 45(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(b). An accused's plea of guilty to offenses underlying a capital felony murder charge may in effect amount to a prohibited plea of guilty to the capital offense. United States v. Dock, 28 M.J. 117 (C.M.A. 1989).").

An MJ convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of conspiracy to commit murder, premeditated murder, three specifications of larceny, and obstruction of justice. [He] was sentenced to LWOP, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a DD. The CA approved the sentence adjudged but, pursuant to a PTA, suspended the "without eligibility for parole" portion of the sentence until the appellant's discharge from the Navy.
. . . 
In his initial appearance before NMCCA, [he] raised four assignments of error, and five supplemental assignments of error[; all] concerned the illegality and/or invalidity, for various reasons, of the PTA provision by which the appellant waived his right to be considered for clemency and parole for a period of 40 years from the date of trial. On remand, the appellant advances three new assignments of error and five supplemental assignments of error. Because our superior court set aside our prior decision and remanded the record for a new Article 66, UCMJ, review, all 17 assignments of error are now before this court.
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We have carefully considered the record of trial, the appellant's 17 assignments of error and his briefs in support thereof, . . We again conclude the appellant's first original assignment of error has merit, and take corrective action in our decretal paragraph.

United States v. Evans, NMCCA 200600806, 2008 CCA LEXIS 299  (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2008), aff'd 67 M.J. 260 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

[A]ppellant argues that his PTA violates R.C.M. 705(c) by denying him the post-trial right to seek clemency and parole. [CCAF] has recently ruled that PTA provisions depriving an appellant of parole and clemency consideration under generally applicable procedures are unenforceable under R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B). United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 64 M.J. 269, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

NMCCA decides the offending clause can be severed from the agreement without finding the whole agreement unlawful. Also, "In his first assignment of error on remand, the appellant argues that the provision of this PTA that calls for a portion of his sentence to be suspended 'until [he is] discharged from the U.S. Navy' is for an unreasonably long time, in violation of R.C.M. 1108(d). We disagree." This was important because

The appellant was initially confined in the Joint Services Brig on Okinawa, Japan. In March 2006, brig authorities discovered the appellant had bribed a guard, paying him $ 1,525.00 for preferential treatment. On 20 July 2006, the guard was convicted by a special court-martial and sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, reduction to pay grade E-1, and six months confinement. He also was confined in the Joint Forces Brig on Okinawa. Shortly thereafter brig authorities transferred the appellant to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Levanworth (sic), Kansas.

[T]he convening authority referred the matter of the appellant's misconduct in the Okinawa brig to the Garrison Commander, Fort Leavenworth, recommending he consider vacating the suspension of a portion of the appellant's sentence. [T]he Garrison Commander referred the matter to COMNAVRESFOR, who in turn, assigned the CO, Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), Kansas City, Missouri, to conduct a hearing pursuant to RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1109, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2005 ed.). 5 On 1 May 2007, the NOSC Kansas City CO held the hearing, and on 29 June 2007, COMNAVRESFOR vacated the suspension.

Important for his civil action in California, CAAF said, "On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, said petition is hereby granted, and the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed."

Evans petitioned the District Court for the Central District of California for compassionate release under the First Step Act.

(As a side note, the opening background paragraph suggests the district judge did not understand sentence vacation proceedings and the lawyers didn't explain the difference between them and a court-martial.)

The relevant language for military prisoners is 

The First Step Act allows federal courts to later reduce a prisoner's sentence imposed in those courts if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," subject to consideration of certain sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the relevant policy statements of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2025). But § 3582 "does not apply to all prisoners" who happen to be housed in a federal civilian prison. Davis v. United States, 124 F.4th 980, 983 (5th Cir. 2025). "[M]ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment." Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). As a result, the federal criminal code governing sentences for federal criminal defendants expressly excludes military prisoners convicted and sentenced under the UCMJ from the sentencing jurisdiction of federal civilian courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a).
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As the text of § 3551(a) states in pertinent part, only criminal defendants found guilty of an offense described in a federal statute "other than" the UCMJ may be sentenced according to the provisions in the same chapter of Title 18 where § 3582 also resides. Id. While that UCMJ exclusion might not apply if "otherwise specifically provided" elsewhere in another statute, there is nothing in the text of § 3582 stating that its compassionate-release provision applies to military prisoners convicted under the UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3582. In other words, because "§ 3582 does not specifically provide that it is applicable to UCMJ defendants," § 3551(a) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to grant compassionate release to convicted military inmates under the First Step Act. Davis, 124 F.4th at 983; accord In re Brown, 2024 WL 910329, at *6-7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2024).