Courts of Criminal Appeals

Air Force

United States v. Clark. A post-trial complaint of "whether the conditions of Appellant’s confinement subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment6 and Article 55, UCMJ, or rendered his sentence inappropriately severe[.]"

​The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has held that an appellate court may grant relief due to confinement conditions even in the absence of an Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation, provided it finds a legal error that warrants relief. United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
. . .
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
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[For the 8th claim, the Appellant bears the burden to show] (1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act or omission resulting in the denial of necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials amounting to deliberate indifference to United States v. Clark, No. ACM 23017 6 [his] health and safety; and (3) that he “has exhausted the prisoner-grievance system . . . and that he has petitioned for relief under Article 138, UCMJ, [10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000)].”

Army

United States v. Torres-Juarez, 84 M.J. ___ (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2024). You have a client accused of DV, is kicked out of quarters, given an MPO, but continues to remain on the lease and pay all or part of any rent--can he be convicted of unlawful entry if he "enters the apartment through the living room window at approximately 0130 without permission? The court says--yes. (Note, he was also in violation of the MPO when doing so.) It is not clear why he entered the apartment, but the spouse was present and bopped in the face few times for his troubles. See United States v. Caruthers, 37 M.J. 1006 (A.C.M.R. 1993) regarding a burglary offense, because ACCA uses that case as a basis for the unlawful entry analysis.

United States v. Leese, 84 M.J. ___ (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2024). Under the new segmented sentencing rules, how does the MJ assign Pierce credit?

Applying Pierce, we hold that confinement credit shall be applied only to the segmented sentence for the offense previously punished under Article 15, UCMJ and not to the total sentence to confinement when the accused is convicted of other offenses. This ensures an accused is not punished twice for the same offense while also ensuring the accused does not receive credit when no credit is due. Whether the military judge determines the sentences to confinement shall run concurrently or consecutively, the result is the same. The accused receives relief that is effective and meaningful towards the offense for which he has already been punished and not towards an offense for which he has not. See United States v. Spaustat, 57 M.J. 256, 263 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (stating the court's precedent contemplates "effective, meaningful relief" when applying confinement credit) (citation omitted).

We acknowledge that other credits towards confinement, such as Article 13 credit and pretrial confinement credit, are applied in a unitary fashion. But the nature of Pierce is different.

Navy-Marine Corps

United States v. Hirst. Urinalysis conviction dismissed (1) a mosaic of good character evidence and (2) flaws in the handling of the sample. For the mosaic good character defense, especially in urinalysis cases, consider United States v. Brewer, 61 M.J. 425 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v. Gagan, 43 M.J. 200 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brown, 41 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1994).