Courts of Criminal Appeals

Air Force

United States v. Ryder

Ryder may join Moore, Hennessy, and Serjak at CAAF on certification.

​A general court-martial composed of a military judge convicted Appellant, in accordance with his pleas, of one charge and one specification of abusive sexual contact without consent, and one charge and one specification of wrongful possession of child pornography. Pursuant to a plea agreement, one specification of soliciting a visual depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 345
days, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand.

Appellant raises two issues on appeal which we have rephrased: (1) whether the military judge abused his discretion in accepting Appellant’s guilty plea to abusive sexual contact without consent in light of United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024), because he failed to establish the named victim was capable of consenting prior to determining that she did not consent; and (2) whether the Government’s 369-day post-trial delay entitles
Appellant to appropriate relief.

In light of Mendoza, we find Appellant’s plea to abusive sexual contact without consent was improvident.

In re HF

Petitioner asked for a writ prohibiting use of evidence, evaluated by the military judge under Mil. R. Evid. 412, that the MJ found admissible.

The Appellee is the alleged victims step-father who is charged with nine specifications of sexual assault on a child who had attained the age of 12 years but had not attained the age of 16 years.

The admitted evidence related to

(1) Petitioner had a rumored romantic or sexual relationship with DF3 from between on or about August 2016 to September 2021 (hereinafter “rumor evidence”), and, (2) in high school, Petitioner engaged in one or more sexual relationships with people other than the RPI (hereinafter “other sexual activity incident).
. . .
Related to the rumor evidence, the Defense argued that the evidence was constitutionally required to be admitted as it relates to Petitioner’s credibility during the charged timeframe and Petitioner’s ability to perceive and recall the charged events. Specifically, the Defense alleged a theory that Petitioner was conflating her alleged sexual relationship with DF with the RPI, thereby potentially falsely accusing the RPI of the allegations. The Defense also argued that evidence of the rumor, or actual romantic or sexual relationship between Petitioner and DF, was relevant, material, and necessary for the trier of fact to assess their credibility and motives to fabricate.

Related to the other sexual activity incident, the Defense argued this evidence was constitutionally required to understand the context of Petitioner’s relationship with her mother and the RPI. They further argued this evidence was necessary to understand why Petitioner moved out of the home she shared with the RPI and how this incident “sparked” reporting the allegations against the RPI which are now the subject of the court-martial.

Coast Guard

United States v. Reimonenq

This is a Government appeal of a suppression of statements.

Appellee filed a motion to suppress statements he made to shipmates and separately to Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) agents. The military judge granted in part and denied in part the suppression motion. The Government gave timely notice and filed this appeal.

​The Government asserts:

I. The military judge abused his discretion when he found Appellee did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Article 31(b) rights; and

II. The military judge misapplied the law when he found the Appellee in custody, thereby triggering the Appellee’s Fifth Amendment rights. Furthermore, if the Appellee was in custody, the military judge abused his discretion when determining the Appellee did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment rights.

We conclude that the military judge did not misapply the law in determining Appellee was in custody at the time that CGIS interrogated him and did not abuse his discretion by concluding the Government failed to demonstrate that Appellee knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ, and the Fifth Amendment.
. . . 
In a 33-page ruling, the military judge concluded that the majority of Appellee’s statements to command personnel were admissible under a public safety exception to Article 31’s general rule requiring warnings before questioning. He, however, granted the motion to suppress Appellee’s answer to a question about why he had weapons, concluding it fell outside of the public safety exception, as well as Appellee’s statements to CGIS, concluding that Appellee had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. 

These are the basic facts supporting a finding the Appellant was in custody.

 On his arrival at Legare, Appellee was intercepted and taken to the Chiefs’ Mess, had his belongings (including his car keys, wallet, and cell phone) taken away, was escorted to a mental health examination, then escorted to the UPH and placed in a room under watch. A crewmember remained posted outside the room, and although they did not have firearms, at least one posted crewmember was carrying pepper spray and handcuffs. In total, a period of ten hours in which Appellee was not in control of his movements passed prior to the arrival of the CGIS agents. Under the totality of these circumstances, and the additional, detailed factual findings of the military judge, a reasonable person would “have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”

The military judge correctly used the objective test, which asks if "a reasonable person in Appellee’s circumstances would not have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. 

[T]he Government asserts that only circumstances created by CGIS should be considered in determining whether a person is in custody. This assertion is unsupported by military case law and is instead based on civilian case law analyzing circumstances created by non-governmental actors, e.g., a hospital admission or being a passenger in a car. This assertion also ignores the fact that all the circumstances of Appellee’s custody were imposed by his CO, a government actor with roles and duties directly related to the enforcement of military discipline.

​