Courts of Criminal Appeals

Air Force

United States v. Floyd.

Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Government’s posttrial delay [of 155 days] entitles Appellant to appropriate relief; (2) whether the conditions of Appellant’s confinement subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) whether the sentence that included a punitive separation is inappropriately severe.

The court has a list of nonexclusive factors

​In determining whether the sentence remains appropriate in light of posttrial processing delay:

1. How long did the delay exceed the standards set forth in [Moreno]?

2. What reasons, if any, has the [G]overnment set forth for the delay? Is there any evidence of bad faith or gross indifference to the overall post-trial processing of this case?

3. Keeping in mind that our goal under Tardif is not to analyze for prejudice, is there nonetheless some evidence of harm (either to the appellant or institutionally) caused by the delay?

4. Has the delay lessened the disciplinary effect of any particular aspect of the sentence, and is relief consistent with the dual goals of justice and good order and discipline?

5. Is there any evidence of institutional neglect concerning timely post-trial processing, either across the service or at a particular installation?

6. Given the passage of time, can this court provide meaningful relief in this particular situation? We consider no single factor dispositive, and a given case may reveal other appropriate considerations for this court in deciding whether post-trial delay has rendered an appellant’s sentence inappropriate.

Gay, 74 M.J. at 744 (footnote omitted).

Of interest, "[T]he detailed court reporter worked on six different courts-martial, either in session or conducting transcription, in the four months following Appellant’s sentencing. On 8 April 2024—112 days after Appellant’s sentencing—the detailed court reporter requested assistance for another court reporter to transcribe Appellant’s case “in an attempt to meet the Moreno date.” A different court reporter began transcribing Appellant’s case the following day and completed the transcription two days later on 11 April 2024."

United States v. Cole.

This decision is AFCCA's response on remand from CAAF. The court finds sentence reassessment is the appropriate remedy and not a remand for resentencing.

Army

United States v. Yepez.

On appeal, this court set aside the finding of guilty and sentence after concluding the military judge abused his discretion in excluding evidence under Military Rule of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 412. After the convening authority elected to retry the case, a different military judge again convicted appellant, contrary to his plea, of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCM.I. The military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for twenty-four months [vice the twenty-eight months originally].

Navy-Marine Corps

United States v. Smith, __ M.J. ___, (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2025).

This case of one of first impression in an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal. The court holds that a motion for reconsideration by the government of an adverse ruling filed within 72 hours of the ruling resets the clock for filing a notice of appeal. Seems fair and reasonable (supported of course by some law). This practice also accords with the practice in an Article 66/67 appeal where there is a timely motion for reconsideration.

United States v. Skinner.

The Appellant pled guilty to a unauthorized absence ((UA) of 97 days with a voluntary surrender) and using marijuana. If you have a case where there are mental health issues but a PTA may be the best damage control--read Skinner.

Appellant underwent a psychological evaluation during boot camp in February 2020. The licensed clinical psychologist recommended her for administrative separation due to a diagnosis of unspecified mood disorder.10 The licensed clinical psychologist opined: “[Appellant] is psychologically responsible for her behavior.” Appellant subsequently completed boot camp and follow on school and reported to USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). Aboard the ship, Appellant was again evaluated by a mental health provider on 21 September 2022. The provider diagnosed Appellant with Borderline Personality Disorder and recommended her for administrative separation. The provider concluded that Appellant was “mentally responsible for [her] behavior and possesses sufficient capacity to understand and cooperate in any applicable administrative proceedings.” Appellant’s command initiated the administrative separation process. On 4 January 2023, Appellant decided to leave the ship without authorization and drive across the country to her family’s home in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Appellant notified her superiors that she could not remain on her ship.

During run up to the guilty plea (GP), the Appellant underwent an R.C.M. 706 examination and was found competent. She acknowledged during the Care inquiry there was no mental health defense and also agreed to that in the Stipulation. However, there were a number of instances during the Care inquiry and DC's argument that caused the MJ to reopen the Care inquiry.

NMCCA found the MJ took great care to address the potential defense such that a guilty plea could be entered and a sentence of 30 days in the Brig and RiR to E-1 was appropriate.

Now—after receiving the full benefit of the plea agreement—Appellant asks us to set aside her convictions because the military judge did not inquire further into the possible defense of lack of mental responsibility. We disagree, find no prejudicial error, and affirm.

NMCCA presents a useful outline of cases and questions to be asked when there is a possible mental responsibility defense arising through the Care inquiry, the Stipulation, an unsworn, etc. Keep in mind that while there may not be a defense, the appellant's mental state may have relevance in extenuation or mitigation.