Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Adams is the first decision of this season. A writ appeal petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, thus affirming ACCA's summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over his habeas petition.

Although charges against Appellant were first referred to a general court-martial in 2012, his case did not come before this Court on direct review until 2020. In its decision on direct review, this Court affirmed some findings, set aside other findings, and set aside the sentence. At a rehearing on the sentence in 2022, a military judge sentenced Appellant to a reduction to the grade of E-1, confinement for 260 months, and a dishonorable discharge. The ACCA summarily affirmed the sentence in an unpublished per curiam decision.

Appellant then petitioned this Court for a second review. This Court denied the petition for review on October 17, 2024, and denied reconsideration on November 22, 2024. On December 17, 2024, the convening authority in the case issued an order stating in relevant part that "Article 71(c), UCMJ, having been complied with, the dishonorable discharge will be executed." On December 18, 2024, an order was issued purporting to discharge Appellant as of December 20, 2024.

Despite these actions, the litigation in this case was not yet entirely finished. Appellant timely petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on April 21, 2025. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari on June 2, 2025. . . . On June 13, 2025, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the ACCA. In the petition, he argued the military judge had violated his rights to a speedy trial under R.C.M. 707. He asserted that the ACCA had "jurisdiction to entertain this writ under the All Writs Act," 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). The ACCA summarily dismissed this petition for lack of jurisdiction on June 26, 2025.
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Appellant then filed a writ-appeal petition in this Court, presenting the question "whether the Army Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's writ of habeas corpus." Appellant asked this Court to answer the question in the negative and remand "the case to the ACCA for review of the underlying merits of his habeas petition."

United States v. Adams, No. 25-0217, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 939, at *1-2 (C.A.A.F. Nov. 12, 2025).

CAAF specified two issues: (1) did ACCA lack jurisdiction over the habeas petition, and (2) does CAAF have jurisdiction . . . after a court-martial is final under Article 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 876 (2018), in noncapital cases when a punitive discharge or dismissal has been executed.

The bottom line is (1) yes and (2) no. Neither a CCA nor CAAF has jurisdiction on the facts here. It's a question of finality. CAAF relies on Article 76, unamended since 1956, and Hendrix v. Warden, 49 C.M.R. 146 (C.M.A. 1974). The All Writs Act does not "increase the areas of this Court's jurisdiction[.]" Hendrix holding has not been called into question. See also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 536 (1999) ("Simply stated, there is no source of continuing jurisdiction for the CAAF over all actions administering sentences that the CAAF at one time had the power to review."). CAAF notes that Denedo distinguishes habeas jurisdiction from coram nobis.

However, part of Adams's challenge was that his discharge was invalid, which got him jurisdiction--an argument CAAF rejected. A second point raised was that a military conviction is not final until the time to petition the Supreme Court expires or a petition at the Supreme Court is filed and resolved. CAAF rejects this argument as well.

Note the final paragraph, which relates to the old rules for Supreme Court access.

"Congress considered the issue of extending finality until after the Supreme Court denied review, but chose in Article 71(c)(1)(C), UCMJ, to do so only in cases in which this Court has granted review of a petition and "review is completed." Article 71(c)(1)(C), UCMJ, does not apply here because this Court did not grant Appellant's petition for review."

We are now operating under new rules that give greater access. Does that change the answer for future cases?

Suppose Adams is still confined, or is released on parole or supervised release (or on SOR, a newly evolving issue). He can petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal district court. His issue in the military habeas petition was an R.C.M. 707 violation, notably not his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Thus, a habeas is unlikely to succeed, especially if a district court were to find that the military appellate courts had fully and fairly considered the issue--to which a footnote that "the court has fully considered the issues raised by Appellant, including those under Grostefon , and they are without merit," usually suffices.

Adams was initially convicted of sexually abusing five minors over seven years, for which he was sentenced to Life W/parole. His first appearance at ACCA got him a retrial based on Hills. His second visit led to some interesting discussions about speedy trial, double jeopardy, and statutes of limitation. 

Should Congress revisit Article 71(c)(1)(C)? Does/should it matter when the appellant has access to an Article III court?