Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

United States v. Valentin-Andino.

I. Case SummaryFacts and Procedural History

Appellant, an Airman First Class (E-3), was convicted at a general court-martial of one specification of sexual assault under Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2018). He was sentenced to 90 days' confinement, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. Due to a series of government processing errors—particularly involving the submission of an incomplete record of trial—his appeal was delayed by 1,115 days. These post-trial delays prompted Appellant to seek sentencing relief.

The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) agreed that excessive post-trial delay warranted relief under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, and United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002), citing a pattern of institutional neglect. The AFCCA granted relief by modifying the sentence: the reduction in rank was changed from E-1 to E-2. Appellant challenged this as insufficient and claimed it was not “meaningful” under the law.

II. Legal IssueWhether the phrase “appropriate relief” under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, requires a Court of Criminal Appeals to grant “meaningful” relief that results in tangible benefit to the appellant.

III. HoldingThe Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed the AFCCA’s decision and held that:

• “Appropriate relief” does not require “meaningful” relief.
• The statutory language of Article 66(d)(2) is clear and unambiguous, requiring only that the relief be “suitable” under the circumstances, not necessarily materially beneficial.
• The CCA acted within its discretion in granting the sentence modification from E-1 to E-2, even if the relief had no financial or legal effect due to automatic forfeitures under Articles 58a and 58b, UCMJ.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Statutory Interpretation of Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ

CAAF applied a plain meaning approach consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)):

• The word “appropriate” is defined as “suitable or right for a particular situation.”
• In contrast, “meaningful” implies value or tangible benefit--a different standard not found in the statute.

Thus, by statutory design, "appropriate relief" is a discretionary standard that allows but does not require tangible outcomes.

B. Rejection of Canonical and Legislative Intent Arguments
Appellant argued for the application of statutory canons and legislative intent—specifically, that Congress, aware of Tardif and Pflueger, implied a requirement for meaningful relief in drafting Article 66(d)(2). CAAF rejected this reasoning, invoking Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000), and emphasizing textualism: courts may not read into statutes that which Congress did not expressly include.

C. Supersession of Tardif

The Court also clarified that Tardif and its progeny are superseded by the post-2019 statutory framework of Article 66(d)(2). Relief for post-trial delay now stems solely from Article 66(d)(2) and is not grounded in pre-MJA 2016 interpretations of Article 66(c).

D. No Requirement to Justify Lack of “Meaningful” Relief
The Court rejected the argument that appellate courts must justify why they did not provide “meaningful” relief. It emphasized that the CCA is not required to articulate its rationale, as long as relief granted meets the statutory definition of “appropriate.” See United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

V. Broader Implications and Critical PerspectiveThis ruling reinforces judicial deference to appellate military courts’ discretion and underscores a textualist approach to the interpretation of military statutes. It sends a clear message:

• Appellate relief for post-trial delay is not a punitive tool against institutional negligence, but a case-specific remedy.
• The term “appropriate” grants broad latitude to CCAs, limiting claims of entitlement to “beneficial” outcomes unless Congress explicitly states otherwise.
• While the Court recognized “institutional neglect” in AFCCA’s acknowledgment of systemic post-trial delay, it declined to impose systemic remedies via judicial fiat.

However, the ruling may be critiqued for undermining accountability in the post-trial process. The Court recognized that 16 other cases in FY 2023 involved similar errors, suggesting an ongoing systemic failure—but declined to elevate the standard of relief, arguably missing an opportunity to encourage meaningful institutional reform.

VI. Conclusion

The CAAF’s decision in Valentin-Andino is a definitive statement of statutory interpretation under the post-MJA 2016 UCMJ. The decision affirms:
​

• Relief under Article 66(d)(2) must be “appropriate,” not necessarily “meaningful.”
• The AFCCA’s sentence adjustment from E-1 to E-2, although lacking practical benefit, satisfied the statutory requirement.
• There is no obligation for appellate courts to provide tangible or compensatory relief, nor to explain their reasoning when opting against it.

While the holding aligns with textual statutory construction, it raises policy questions about how effectively military appellate courts deter or redress chronic post-trial administrative failures.