A violation of the public trial guarantee is structural error, defying harmless error review. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 299 (2017). In Waller v. Georgia, this Court said the remedy for a breach of the public trial guarantee “should be appropriate to the violation.” 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). This Court later explained in Weaver v. Massachusetts that the appropriate remedy is, generally, “automatic reversal.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 299.

The question presented is whether, in this capital case, a court of appeals may afford no remedy for a public trial violation where the defendant objected to the closure at trial and raised the issue on direct review?

Whether the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces permissibly declined to order a new trial on petitioner’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated, where a military judge conducted a 34-minute ex parte hearing with petitioner and his standby defense counsel to discuss standby counsel’s motion to withdraw, which implicated petitioner’s privileged information and in which the judge agreed with petitioner’s position opposing withdrawal.

Hasan, a former Army major, was convicted and sentenced to death in 2013, but exhausted his legal appeals in April 2025.

NCIS is soliciting tips from anyone who may have information on the whereabouts of James Tait (Krueger) Praefke, a former Sailor who escaped confinement from Naval Brig Puget Sound, Wash., Nov. 13, 2005 and may be located in the Fort Pierce, Fla. area.

At his court-martial, original charges of child sexual abuse were ultimately withdrawn however he pleaded guilty to stealing, possessing, and transporting ammunition and a grenade, illegally possessing explosives and making a false official statement. He was sentenced to three years in a Navy prison on Oct. 4, 2005, and escaped while awaiting transfer to a prison in California.

The granted issue requires us to decide whether an accused has “a Sixth Amendment right to present evidence of a recorded third party’s confession to the crime for which the accused is on trial.” We conclude that under the facts of this case, the military judge violated Appellant’s constitutional right to present the evidence, and the military judge’s exclusion of such evidence was prejudicial. Accordingly, we set aside the decision of the NMCCA.
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Appellant moved for a preliminary ruling to admit the recording of HM3 Whiskey’s interview with SA Tango and his handwritten note to the victim’s parents under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 807, the residual exception to the rule against hearsay. Appellant’s motion also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), and this Court’s decision in United States v. Woolheater, 40 M.J. 170 (C.M.A. 1994), in arguing that excluding this evidence would violate his Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense. In his ruling on the motion, the military judge determined that the evidence was inadmissible under M.R.E. 807 because the statements were untrustworthy. 

An MJ convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of conspiracy to commit murder, premeditated murder, three specifications of larceny, and obstruction of justice. [He] was sentenced to LWOP, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a DD. The CA approved the sentence adjudged but, pursuant to a PTA, suspended the "without eligibility for parole" portion of the sentence until the appellant's discharge from the Navy.
. . . 
In his initial appearance before NMCCA, [he] raised four assignments of error, and five supplemental assignments of error[; all] concerned the illegality and/or invalidity, for various reasons, of the PTA provision by which the appellant waived his right to be considered for clemency and parole for a period of 40 years from the date of trial. On remand, the appellant advances three new assignments of error and five supplemental assignments of error. Because our superior court set aside our prior decision and remanded the record for a new Article 66, UCMJ, review, all 17 assignments of error are now before this court.
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We have carefully considered the record of trial, the appellant's 17 assignments of error and his briefs in support thereof, . . We again conclude the appellant's first original assignment of error has merit, and take corrective action in our decretal paragraph.

[A]ppellant argues that his PTA violates R.C.M. 705(c) by denying him the post-trial right to seek clemency and parole. [CCAF] has recently ruled that PTA provisions depriving an appellant of parole and clemency consideration under generally applicable procedures are unenforceable under R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B). United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 64 M.J. 269, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

The appellant was initially confined in the Joint Services Brig on Okinawa, Japan. In March 2006, brig authorities discovered the appellant had bribed a guard, paying him $ 1,525.00 for preferential treatment. On 20 July 2006, the guard was convicted by a special court-martial and sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, reduction to pay grade E-1, and six months confinement. He also was confined in the Joint Forces Brig on Okinawa. Shortly thereafter brig authorities transferred the appellant to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Levanworth (sic), Kansas.

[T]he convening authority referred the matter of the appellant's misconduct in the Okinawa brig to the Garrison Commander, Fort Leavenworth, recommending he consider vacating the suspension of a portion of the appellant's sentence. [T]he Garrison Commander referred the matter to COMNAVRESFOR, who in turn, assigned the CO, Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), Kansas City, Missouri, to conduct a hearing pursuant to RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1109, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2005 ed.). 5 On 1 May 2007, the NOSC Kansas City CO held the hearing, and on 29 June 2007, COMNAVRESFOR vacated the suspension.

The First Step Act allows federal courts to later reduce a prisoner's sentence imposed in those courts if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," subject to consideration of certain sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the relevant policy statements of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2025). But § 3582 "does not apply to all prisoners" who happen to be housed in a federal civilian prison. Davis v. United States, 124 F.4th 980, 983 (5th Cir. 2025). "[M]ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment." Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). As a result, the federal criminal code governing sentences for federal criminal defendants expressly excludes military prisoners convicted and sentenced under the UCMJ from the sentencing jurisdiction of federal civilian courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a).
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As the text of § 3551(a) states in pertinent part, only criminal defendants found guilty of an offense described in a federal statute "other than" the UCMJ may be sentenced according to the provisions in the same chapter of Title 18 where § 3582 also resides. Id. While that UCMJ exclusion might not apply if "otherwise specifically provided" elsewhere in another statute, there is nothing in the text of § 3582 stating that its compassionate-release provision applies to military prisoners convicted under the UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3582. In other words, because "§ 3582 does not specifically provide that it is applicable to UCMJ defendants," § 3551(a) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to grant compassionate release to convicted military inmates under the First Step Act. Davis, 124 F.4th at 983; accord In re Brown, 2024 WL 910329, at *6-7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2024).

The warrant for defendant’s computer was overbroad in seeking alleged child pornography of others than the known alleged victims, essentially based on assumptions about child pornographers. State v. Schult, 343 Or. App. 376 (Sep. 10, 2025). This is a rarity:

… However, in reading the affidavit as a whole in a common-sense and realistic fashion, taking into account both facts and inferences, we conclude that the search commands were intended to discover evidence of other crimes, in addition to those alleged against T and R. The affidavit goes into extensive detail about the common actions of child sex abusers, including the frequency with which they share images and content via digital media, methods used for gaining access to and grooming children, and pornography viewing habits. However, none of that general knowledge related to the allegations against defendant. There were no facts relating to defendant’s internet usage, pornography habits, or communications with other individuals. Defendant was accused of abusing the very young children who were already in his household; there were no allegations of him communicating with minors via the internet, social media, or any other digital means. Yet the affidavit explicitly referred to investigating possible other crimes and victims. For example, in a discussion about examining pictures, video, and other media on a suspect’s digital devices, including location and other metadata imbedded within, the warrant stated: “This information could be helpful in identifying unknown child victims whom the suspect encourage[d] or induced to create and transmit sexually explicit images of themselves to the suspect.”
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We therefore conclude that the search categories authorizing police to search for “videos, photographs, or images of children who are naked or engaged in sexually explicit conduct” and for “communications related to child molestation or the creation, distribution, or sharing of child pornography” were not sufficiently particular.

United States v. Roan, __ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. 2025)

A special court-martial composed of officer members found Appellant guilty, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of wrongfully using cocaine and the court members sentenced Appellant to restriction to his residence for 45 days, three months of hard labor without confinement, reduction to the grade of E-2, and a reprimand. The convening authority disapproved the adjudged restriction.

A designated judge advocate completed a review of the record of trial pursuant to Article 65(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865(d). The judge advocate found, inter alia, "[t]he findings and sentence are correct in law and fact."

Pursuant to Article 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869, Appellant submitted an application requesting The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) "vacate and set aside" the findings and sentence due to "newly discovered evidence consist[ing] of information that Security Forces investigators interviewed individuals and obtained evidence that was exculpatory for [Appellant], but never turned it over to the [D]efense, instead destroying the notes that were made." On 3 March 2023, TJAG found no error prejudicial to Appellant's substantial rights and denied relief.

Appellant applied to this court for grant of review pursuant to Article 69(d)(1)(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)(1)(B), raising a single issue: whether the Government violated Appellant's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 701(a)(6) by failing to inform Appellant of exculpatory evidence and destroying an investigative case file. This court granted Appellant's application for review.
. . .
Appellant contends the Government violated his due process rights under Brady as well as his statutory discovery rights under R.C.M. 701(a)(6) by failing to disclose Inv NM's investigation of the pre-workout supplement, including the purported statement by an MRO that DMHA could under certain circumstances produce a positive urinalysis result for the metabolite of cocaine. The Government contends there was no constitutional or statutory violation, and assuming arguendo the Government should have disclosed the information pursuant to R.C.M. 701(a)(6), Appellant cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result. We find Appellant is not entitled to relief.
. . .
​The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law, and no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred.

The term opens by focusing on the Sixth Amendment’s right to “Assistance of Counsel.”
The very first oral argument of the term should feature some fun hypotheticals, and prove to be extremely important for the conduct of criminal trials. Villarreal v. Texas presents an exercise in constitutional line-drawing between two Sixth Amendment precedents. When a trial court recesses for the day while a criminal defendant is testifying, may a trial court bar defense counsel and their client from discussing the defendant’s testimony overnight? One might think that the “assistance of counsel” would be particularly important at such a stage. However, two precedents, decided by two very different alignments of justices 12 years apart, point in opposite directions.

A Fourth Amendment case: what level of suspicion of an “emergency” must law enforcement have to enter a house without a warrant?
When William Trevor Case’s ex-girlfriend told the police that Case was threatening suicide, the police knew Case well and that he had tried to stimulate “suicide by cop” before. After waiting and debating for some 40 minutes outside Case’s house, officers entered, without attempting to get a warrant. The entry is what is at issue in this case; with many post-entry facts in play, Case was later convicted of assault of an officer after a motion to suppress evidence – found after the warrantless entry of his house – was denied. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, 4-3.

Barrett v. United States (Oct. 7): Does the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause permit two (consecutive) sentences for the same federal robbery act that violates two criminal provisions?

Aaron Wilson and Sean Dillon, both former members of the United States Army, were convicted by court-martial for engaging in sex crimes during their active-duty service. Wilson and Dillon filed habeas petitions, arguing that the statutory grant of military jurisdiction over retired military personnel—particularly, those who have been medically retired—exceeds Congress's authority to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" because, in their view, retirees are no longer part of "the land and naval Forces." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("Make Rules Clause"). The district court denied their petitions. We affirm.

"Although the military judge did not ask whether appellant's intent to remain away permanently formed at any time before starting his job at Moxie Pest Control or whether his intent changed throughout the duration of his absence, the military judge concluded appellant's plea to desertion for the period charged was provident.

The "intent to remain away permanently need not be formed in the mind of the accused at the moment of departure ." for an appellant to be found guilty of desertion. "The crime of desertion can be established by the showing of an absence with a concurring intent, at the commencement of or at some time during the absence, to remain away permanently." This statement of law from our superior court is echoed in the Manual for Courts-Martial ("The intent to remain away permanently may be formed any time during the unauthorized absence. The intent need not exist throughout the absence as long as it exists at some time during the absence.").

Appellant's providence colloquy details a factual scenario contemplated by Article 85, UCMJ.

I join Senior Judge Fleming's dissent in every respect. I write separately to crystallize things. This Court radically agrees appellant deserted his unit. But we disagree over the affirmed inception date, based on an equally radical disagreement over one of criminal law's first principles.

The government proved nothing in this case no criticism there, for appellant obviated that burden by pleading guilty and waiving his right to a trial. This constrains our decisional facts to the providence inquiry and stipulation of fact, and both tell us he formed the "intent to remain away therefrom permanently" in March 2023. In this case, the Court cannot circumstantially infer a more specific, earlier date; doing so would create an irreconcilable conflict with the providence inquiry and stipulation of fact