Air Force

​The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has held that an appellate court may grant relief due to confinement conditions even in the absence of an Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation, provided it finds a legal error that warrants relief. United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
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“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
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[For the 8th claim, the Appellant bears the burden to show] (1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act or omission resulting in the denial of necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials amounting to deliberate indifference to United States v. Clark, No. ACM 23017 6 [his] health and safety; and (3) that he “has exhausted the prisoner-grievance system . . . and that he has petitioned for relief under Article 138, UCMJ, [10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000)].”

Army

Applying Pierce, we hold that confinement credit shall be applied only to the segmented sentence for the offense previously punished under Article 15, UCMJ and not to the total sentence to confinement when the accused is convicted of other offenses. This ensures an accused is not punished twice for the same offense while also ensuring the accused does not receive credit when no credit is due. Whether the military judge determines the sentences to confinement shall run concurrently or consecutively, the result is the same. The accused receives relief that is effective and meaningful towards the offense for which he has already been punished and not towards an offense for which he has not. See United States v. Spaustat, 57 M.J. 256, 263 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (stating the court's precedent contemplates "effective, meaningful relief" when applying confinement credit) (citation omitted).

We acknowledge that other credits towards confinement, such as Article 13 credit and pretrial confinement credit, are applied in a unitary fashion. But the nature of Pierce is different.

Navy-Marine Corps

During the Government's direct examination of Zheng, he testified that he had discussed with colleagues his concerns about Huang giving Huizar casino chips. On cross-examination, Zheng stated that he raised his concerns directly with Huang. When defense counsel asked Zheng about Huang's response, the district court sustained the Government's objection on hearsay grounds. The court erred in doing so.
Zheng's expected testimony falls under the state-of-mind exception to hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) allows for the admission of “[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional...condition (such as mental feeling...).” As the parties acknowledge, defense counsel sought to elicit Huang's out-of-court response to Zheng that Huang thought he and Huizar “were just having fun,” “not doing anything wrong,” and that he “had not asked...Huizar for anything.” Had Zheng been able to offer this testimony, it would have been probative not as to the truth of these statements but whether Huang felt culpable in his interactions with Huizar....Although Zheng could not testify as to the factual basis for Huang's mindset,...at least some of the excluded statements were probative of Huang's “then-existing state of mind” and “mental feeling” about his actions—admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay. 

Property seized or held as evidence, other than contraband or other property which cannot legally be returned, will be returned to its rightful owner when it is determined that the property has no evidentiary value or when criminal proceedings have concluded and the time to initiate appeals has passed. . . . Coordination with the servicing SJA office must occur prior to disposition of evidence.
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(1) Evidence in a closed unfounded investigation may be disposed of immediately after the appropriate USACIDC commander/SAC/RAC, PM, or the PM’s designated representative, or CI commander/SAC reviews and approves the release by completing the final disposal authority section of the DA Form 4137.
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​Authorization for disposal of computer and network hardware. This paragraph pertains to the USACIDC trained digital media collector and/or digital forensic examiner (DFE) only. Computer and network hardware taken as evidence may be immediately released for final disposal after a forensically sound image of the digital data has been successfully obtained as evidence. The immediate final disposal authority may be granted by the supporting trial counsel, the civilian prosecutor, or the director or operations officer.
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The evidence custodian should be aware that required judicial and appellate procedures may significantly extend the time that evidence must be maintained. In the military justice system, for example, the following procedures generally apply[] . . . 

Natl. L. Rev.: The Reasonableness of Retaining Personal Property Post-Seizure and the Ascendancy of Text, History, and Tradition in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence by Ty E. Howard [the case is posted here]:
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How long can the government keep your property after lawfully seizing it? According to the D.C. Circuit in a recent decision, as long as the continued possession is still reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This decision furthers a split among circuit courts and portends how the text, history, and tradition method might influence Fourth Amendment cases.

Asinor v. District of Columbia, No. 22-7129, — F.4th —, 2024 WL 3733171 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) involved several consolidated appeals raising the question above.

“Petitioner argues the PCR court erred in finding he suffered no prejudice from plea counsel's failure to advise him that entering the Alford plea would result in mandatory deportation and a permanent ban on reentry. We disagree.”

At the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified counsel knew he was from Mexico and counsel told him it would be possible he would be deported.3 Petitioner testified plea counsel never explained he would be placed on the sex offender registry or what that entails. He further testified plea counsel did not explain that a sexual crime against a child is considered a crime of moral turpitude or advise that by entering such a plea, Petitioner would "be banned completely from ever reporting legal status in the United States." Plea counsel testified, "I told him that immigration was probably gonna come and get him when his sentence was over no matter when it ended . . . and that they would use this conviction against him as a reason to deport him." When asked on cross-examination about whether he explained the immigration consequences that would result from the plea, plea counsel responded, "Yes, I'm sure I did. I told him that it would be used against him in a deportation proceeding if there was one." Plea counsel acknowledged the plea would completely bar Petitioner from ever legally entering the United States, but when asked whether Petitioner understood that by entering the plea he would not be permitted to return to raise his children, counsel responded, "I don't know if I ever told him he'd never be able to come back to the United States. I may not have gone over that with him, but he was very much aware that the immigration court would—you know, this would be used against him and he would probably be deported."

We find the PCR court correctly found plea counsel was deficient in failing to explicitly advise Petitioner of the mandatory deportation and ban on reentry Petitioner faced if he entered this Alford plea. In Taylor v. State, our supreme court explained, "If the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain, 'a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a non-citizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.'" 422 S.C. 222, 225, 810 S.E.2d 862, 863 (2018) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). "However, where the terms of the relevant immigration statute are 'succinct, clear, and explicit' in defining the removal consequence, counsel has an 'equally clear' duty to give correct advice." Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69).

Here, the terms of the removal statutes are succinct, clear, and explicit in mandating Petitioner was deportable if convicted. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 3 Petitioner interrupted the plea hearing eight times to ask questions and confer with his counsel. However, none of the interruptions appear to have been regarding immigration consequences. (a)(2)(A)(i) .