Appellant was tried before our recent decisions held that is it impermissible to use Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 413 propensity evidence "as a mechanism for admitting evidence of charged conduct to which an accused has pleaded not guilty in order to show a propensity to commit the very same charged conduct." However, the Hills and Hukill decisions were issued by the time Appellant's case was reviewed by the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. Citing our holding in those cases, the lower court held that the military judge erred in Appellant's case by permitting evidence of the charged sexual offenses to be used as M.R.E. 413 propensity evidence and by instructing the members accordingly. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the finding of guilt and the sentence as to Specification 1 of Additional Charge II 3 and authorized a rehearing. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the remaining findings of guilt as to Specifications 1 and 3 of the Charge, finding the Hills error for those specifications to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ​

Prasad was a service member in the United States Air Force. In general terms, this case originated with a military case against Prasad, which began in 2015. Prasad's military case has a convoluted procedural history that the Court need not address with any particularity for purposes of this Order. See, e.g., Doc. No. 1-6, pp. 19-20 (where a military judge noted that the "complexity of the case is well documented in its Article 32 investigations, trial, and sentence rehearing"). Suffice it to say, the nature of Prasad's military case prompted him to file his Petition with this Court on March 12, 2021.  
The Petition consists of three separate (though somewhat related) requests for relief: (1) a petition for habeas corpus; (2) a complaint for declaratory judgment; and (3) a petition for a writ of mandamus. Id. Prasad first requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the Government to release him from Grand Forks Air Force Base and honorably discharge him from the Air Force. He then requests that the Court enter a declaratory judgment finding that the Government "divested itself of personal jurisdiction over [him], such that he can no longer be court-martialed." To that end, Prasad lists the following bases for divestiture: (1) the Government's "wrongful denial of the `privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments of the status and rank' to which [Prasad] is entitled," (2) the Government's "failure to provide [Prasad] with any duties commensurate of his rank," and (3) "the lack of intention to court-martial him at Grand Forks [Air Force Base]."  
Prasad additionally requests that the Court issue a writ of mandamus for the correction of records and restoration of his rights and privileges pursuant to Article 75 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

In any event, we find no error, plain or otherwise. To warrant an instruction on the mistake of fact defense there must be "some evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake to which the members could have attached credit if they had so desired." United States v. Hibbard, 58 M.J. 71, 75 (C.A.A.F. 2003). While there is no per se requirement an accused testify to establish a mistake of fact defense, evidence that the accused honestly and reasonably believed the victim had consented must come from somewhere. See United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 199). In many cases, the only source of admissible evidence about an accused's subjective belief may well be from the accused himself.

The United States and its NATO allies are facing forceful calls to impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukrainian skies, with the idea of countering Russian aggression in the region, easing humanitarian suffering, and protecting Ukrainian civilians trying to flee the fighting. Ukraine has requested a no-fly zone repeatedly. In the United States, polling shows this is a popular idea: three-quarters of Americans support a NATO-imposed no-fly zone. But a no-fly zone does not equate to a no-combat zone. Quite the opposite. Enforcing a no-fly zone requires the use of military force, and in Ukraine, that would likely mean confronting the Russian military head-on.

Judge Lauck of the Eastern District of Virginia recently handed down the long-awaited opinion in United States v. Chatrie, on how the Fourth Amendment applies to geofencing warrants.  I believe this is the first Article III judicial opinion on the subject. Geofence warrants raise some really interesting Fourth Amendment issues, and we're likely to hear more about those issues. ​

The Courts of Appeals have divided over the meaning of ACCA’s “occasions” clause. Some Circuits, like the Sixth, deem the clause satisfied whenever crimes take place at different moments in time—that is, sequentially rather than simultaneously. Other Circuits undertake a more holistic inquiry, considering not merely the precise timing but also other circumstances of the crimes. We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve that split of authority.

[The government argued that ten burglaries happening sequentially are ten offenses. ]

We think not. The ordinary meaning of the word “occasion”—essentially an episode or event—refutes the Government’s single-minded focus on whether a crime’s elements were established at a discrete moment in time. And ACCA’s history and purpose do so too: The origin of the “occasions” clause confirms that multiple crimes may occur on one occasion even if not at the same moment. Wooden’s night of crime is a perfect case in point. His one-after-another-after another burglary of ten units in a single storage facility occurred on one “occasion,” under a natural construction of that term and consistent with the reason it became part of ACCA.